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1. Introduction 
On December 22, 1980, the Minister of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs, acting pursuant to the Hazardous Products 
Act,' banned the sale of "Urea Formaldehyde based thermal 
insulation, foamed in place, used to insulate  building^."^ Three 
years earlier, in June, 1977, the Minister of State for Urban 
Affairs had announced a 1.4 billion dollar home insulation 
programme designed to encourage Canadian homeowners to 
conserve energy through the retrofitting of residential homes3 - 
formaldehyde insulation was included in the programme by the 
Central Mortgage and Housing C~rpora t ion .~  Some months 
previously, a subsidiary of the Canada Development Corporation 
Part I1 of the paper, as well as Comments on the paper by Michael J. Trebilcock and 
Andrew J. Roman, will appear in the next issue of the Journal. 
Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This paper, 
and the Comments following it, were presented at the Twelfth Annual Workshop on 
Commercial and Consumer Law held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, on 
October 23,1982. 
R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3 as amended. 
See SORl81-30, Can. Gaz .  Part 11, Vol. 115 ,  No. 1, p. 80. 
See, infra, Part 11. 
4 Ibid. 
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had purchased 100% of the common shares of Rapco Foam 
Incorporated, a company engaged in the manufacture and distri- 
bution of urea formaldehyde foam insulation  component^.^ In 
1976, a complaint had been filed by the Metropolitan Denver 
District Attorney's Consumer Office6 under s. 10 of the 
Consumer Product Safety Act7 requesting the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission to develop a standard under s. 7 of the Act, 
for certain home insulation products including urea formaldehyde 
foam insulation. In 1974, Canadian patents for Insulspray and for 
a foaming apparatus to apply foam insulation were granted to 
Borden Products Limited, Canada.8 In 1970 the Central 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation had requested the Canadian 
Government Specifications Board to develop a product standard 
for urea formaldehyde ins~la t ion .~  
Urea formaldehyde foam insulation (UFFI) is an insulating 
material commonly used to insulate existing residential and 
commercial buildings. It is manufactured on site, and is usually 
injected into the interstitial wall cavities through holes drilled in 
the outside wall. The product is produced by mixing a resin, 
foaming agent and compressed air, and pumping the resulting 
mixture into the wall cavities. The foam is intended to have the 
consistency of shaving cream when first produced, but begins to 
set almost immediately. The curing process may take several 
weeks. lo 
During the 10 years prior to the ban, perhaps 80,000 Canadians 
insulated their homes with the insulation.I1 This group of 
individuals comprises the class which has been most directly 
affected as a result of the use of the insulation. A Canadian 
Canada Development Corporation, Annual Report (1976), at p. 6. 
6 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Ban of Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, 
Withdrawal of Proposed Information Labelling Rule, and Denial of Petition to Issue a 
Standard, Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 64,14366 at 14367. 
1.5 U.S.C. 2059. 
8 Canadian Patent, Urea Formaldehyde Foam, No. 1013499; Canadian Patent, Foaming 
Apparatus, No. 1014193, both granted to Borden Products Limited, Canada. 
9 SORl78-241, Can. Gar .  Pari l l ,  Vol. 112, No. 6, p. 1032. 
'OThis description is taken from the Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra, 
footnote 6 at 14366; see also C. Shirtliffe, A. Bowles, "Development of a Canadian 
Standard for Urea Formaldehyde Thermal Wall Insulation", in Thermal Insulation 
Performance, A.S.T.M. SpecialTechnical Publication 718 (1978), at p. 361. In the latter 
paper, the authors point out that there are two types of material systems sold in Canada. 
For the purposes of legal analysis the description in the text is sufficient. 
This figure is a "best estimate". 
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expert advisory committee on formaldehyde, and the federal 
Consumer Product Safety Commission in the United States 
concluded that individuals exposed to the foam environment may 
suffer acute and chronic irritant reactions, chronic allergic 
reactions and perhaps general chemical sensitization.12 None the 
less, it seems that a substantial majority of homeowners cannot 
point to, or perhaps prove, existing personal injuries, adverse 
health effects or physical property damage to their homes which 
are causally related to the presence of foam insulation. The loss 
suffered by these persons represented by the decrease in the 
value of their homes may be referred to as abstract economic loss. 
The dissemination of information across the market, perhaps 
coupled with the apparent technological infeasibility of distin- 
guishing "safer" homes from "less safe" homes,l3 has resulted in 
a marked stigmatic effect which is reflected in a devaluation of all 
homes. As well, the devaluation has not been discounted by the 
probability of the risk materializing.14 The loss is abstract in so far 
as it is not related to a demonstrable defect which has manifested 
itself in a particular home. Consequently, the class of potential 
plaintiffs includes the vast majority of foam insulation purchasers 
who are seeking compensation either for the reduced market 
value of their homes (i. e. , abstract consequential economic loss), 
or alternatively, for the cost of repair. This, as is well known, may 
12The medical research and conclusions to date may be found in several sources. See 
N. P. Drago, J. G. Pruett and S. G. Winslow, "Health Aspects of Urea-Formaldehyde 
Compounds, A Selected Bibliography with Abstracts 1964-1980, Toxicology Inform- 
ation Response Center (December, 1980); Department of National Health and 
Welfare, Expert Advisory Committee on Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Final 
Repon (1981); Kurzman, Shapiro and Monahan, Formaldehyde Bibliography Outline 
(April, 1981); B .  M. Small, Chemical Susceptibility and Urea-Formaldehyde Foam 
Insulation (1982); J .  Day, Report on Certain Health Hazards Associated with Urea 
Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Exhibit 13, Hazardous Products Board of Review, 
Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation; Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra, 
footnote 6 at 14369-92, and Appendices A and C. This perception has been confirmed in 
the House of Commons, Report on Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Standing 
Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs (December, 1982), at paras. 59-99. 
13The reliability of testing procedures for formaldehyde gas is open to debate. See 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra, footnote 6 at 14382-85; Small, supra, 
footnote 12 at p. 18; D. Williams, R. Otson and P. Bothwell, "Formaldehyde Levels in 
the Air of Homes Containing Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation", 72 Can. J. of Pub. 
Health 331 (1981), at p. 334; C. Shirtliffe, Report, Exhibit 22, Hazardous Products 
Board of Review, Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation. 
l 4  See Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra, footnote 6 at 14395. 
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present considerable difficulties in an action for recovery of 
compensation in a negligence suit.I5 
The parties to whom these homeowners may look for compen- 
sation include several manufacturers of the chemicals from which 
formaldehyde foam insulation is manufactured on site. These 
manufacturers did not, however, manufacture a consumer 
product. The possible claim that the loss was caused by a design 
defect in the insulation product, must be reformulated as a claim 
that the manufacturing process was defectively designed. The 
chemical component manufacturers had designed and patentedI6 
a manufacturing process which they transferred, together with 
the component chemicals, to hundreds of manufacturers who 
manufactured the consumer product on site. The design defect, if 
it exists at all, is inherent in the process which resulted in the 
presence of foam insulation in the walls of the home." 
In addition to the possibility of process design negligence, it 
may be possible to argue that the chemical component manufac- 
turers are liable in failing to disclose the risks that the foam might 
not perform as expected. The duty-to-warn allegation is, 
however, complicated by the fact that the potential defendants 
did not manufacture a consumer product which could be labelled, 
or  which could be accompanied by "package insert" instructional 
material. The duty to warn must be imposed on a component 
manufacturer which raises both doctrinal and conceptual 
difficulties. I* 
Finally, it may be possible to develop a strict products liability 
trade practice action in several provinces, which establishes non- 
disclosure of risks and marketing conduct as deceptive or unfair 
acts in so far as these activities may have led to consumer misper- 
ception about the quality or  performance characteristics of the 
product.19 Trade practice legislation has not generally been 
considered to be an effective products liability weapon. It 
appears, however, that the abrogation of the privity doctrine, the 
imposition of strict or  absolute liability, and the conceptualization 
of the product defect as consumer misperception of safety, may 
I S  Recovery of economic loss in tort as i t  applies to the UFFl case is discussed, infra, at pp. 
359-73. 
16 See supra, footnote 8. 
The review of design defects is discussed, infra, at pp. 315-16. 
18 See infra, at pp. 326-36. 
19 The development of a strict products liability trade practice action is discussed, infra, at 
pp. 351-9. 
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permit the legislation, in several provinces at least, to be 
employed as a strict products liability act. 
Another potential argument of homeowners may focus on the 
implied contractual obligations of foam installers. The instal- 
lation contract, whether viewed as a service or sales contract, will 
normally be considered as including the implied conditions that 
the goods transferred will be of merchantable quality and 
reasonably fit for its intended purposes. The application of these 
conditions to the formaldehyde problem must involve an analysis 
of the liability of a product supplier when, as is common in the 
urea formaldehyde case, the specific product sold is functioning 
adequately, and is not demonstrably defective. The product is, 
however, valueless, and the residential home into which it is 
installed may be significantly devalued. The loss, of course, is due 
to the market perception of risk, and the technological inability to 
distinguish "safer" from "less safe" homes.*O 
The issue of potential governmental liability is possibly the 
most complicated of the legal aspects of the formaldehyde 
problem. A meaningful factual description of the governmental 
activity in this area over 10 years is necessarily complex.21 Briefly, 
a Crown corporation, the then Central Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (C.M.H.C.) was given authority pursuant to 
regulations enacted under appropriation legi~la t ion~~ to pay out 
money to purchasers of insulation products which the corporation 
had "accepted". The corporation apparently decided to accept 
those products which met a manufacturing standard established 
by the Canadian Government Specifications Board,23 (now the 
Canadian General Standards Board (C.G.S.B.)) and which also 
met certain additional requirements established by C.M.H.C. 
itself.24 The Board ratified a standard which was formulated on 
the basis of industry research data, by a working committee one- 
third of whose membership was drawn from industry. Another 
Crown corporation, the National Research Council, provided 
20 The analysis of potential contract claims is reviewed, infra, at pp. 336-51. 
2' Space does not permit a complete description of an exceedingly complex issue. A 
comprehensive paper describing governmental activities in relation to urea formal- 
dehyde foam insulation is on file at the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
22 Appropriation Act, No. 3, S.C. 1977-78, c. 2, Urban Affairs Vote l l a .  Canadian Home 
Insulation Regulations SORl78-241, Can. Gaz.  Parrll, Vol. 112, No. 6, p. 1032. 
23 See Shirtliffe and Bowles, supra, footnote 10 at p. 361. 
24 See Report on Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, supra, footnote 12 at para. 48. 
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technical advice to the C.G.S.B. committee and to C.M.H.C. 
The Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, which 
developed the retrofit programme, and which was responsible for 
the government information programmes pursuant to which 
information relating to insulation was disseminated to the public, 
argued against the adoption of a formaldehyde insulation 
standard. Its view did not apparently prevail, as financial and 
product choice authority over the programme had been delegated 
to C.M.H.C. 
The question of governmental liability for the activities of the 
individuals acting in the C.G.S.B. under the Department of 
Supply and Services for the decisions of the individuals 
acting in the Office of Energy Conservation in the Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, for the acts of C.M.H.C. as a 
Crown corporation, perhaps acting as an agent of the Crown, and 
for the acts of the National Research Council also acting as a 
Crown agent, will depend upon an initial determination that 
those individuals or corporations owed a private legal duty of care 
to individual members of the public. That decision, it seems, will 
involve the court in drawing an entirely artificial line between 
"policy" decisions which are beyond the scope of judicial review, 
and "operational" decisions which will be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny.26 
The subject of this paper, then, is the private and public law 
dimensions of the formaldehyde problem. The topics which I 
have chosen to discuss are directly relevant to any inquiry into the 
nature of the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial processes which 
together created the UFFI problem. My concern is not to fix 
blame, and I have chosen not to draw conclusions in respect of 
the doctrinal and policy issues which I discuss. Rather, I have 
attempted to describe the regulatory process which was 
associated with the development of the product, and to discuss 
the role of the courts in reviewing alleged bureaucratic incompe- 
tence. As well, I have chosen to analyze several "private law" 
issues which I consider demonstrate the quite unique, and in 
some ways intractable, analytical, doctrinal and practical issues 
raised in the UFFI cases. 
2SR.S.C. 1970,c.S-18,s.8. 
26 See Public Law Dimensions, infra, Part 11. 
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2. Private Law Dimensions 
The urea formaldehyde industry in Canada has been 
dominated by two major chemical component manufacturersz7 
who between them controlled 90% of the Canadian market.28 
These companies had obtained patents in respect of the manufac- 
turing process and production of urea formaldehyde foam insula- 
tion, and in respect of the equipment used in the production 
process.29 Generally, these companies sold the component 
chemicals from which the foam is produced to local contractors, 
who numbered in the hundreds30 by the date of the product ban in 
1980. The contracts between the chemical component manufac- 
turers and the contractors provided the latter with a licence to use 
the patented manufacturing process, and required some limited 
training of the latters' employees. 
An analysis of the legal liability of component chemical 
manufacturers and contractors focuses on four quite distinct 
issues. First, were the component manufacturers legally respon- 
sible for the design of a defective consumer product? Second, 
were. the manufacturers or installers liable for failing to warn 
consumers of the risks associated with formaldehyde foam insula- 
tion? Third, were the installers liable for damages resulting from 
breaches of the implied conditions of merchantability and fitness 
for purpose? Fourth, were the manufacturers or installers liable 
under trade practice legislation for misrepresenting or failing to 
disclose information regarding the safety and performance 
characteristics of their products? 
(1) Design Defects 
The manufacturers' responsibility for the design of urea 
formaldehyde foam insulation will depend either on a determi- 
nation that the foam insulation is an "unreasonably dangerous" 
product, or alternatively, that the manufacturer failed to take 
reasonable care in designing the product. The concept of an 
unreasonably dangerous product is taken from the American 
27 See Canadian Plastics, October, 1980, at p. 38. 
See Financial Post, October 24,1981, at p. 33. 
29 See, supra, footnote 8. 
30 See Globe and Mail, December 20, 1980, at p. 4; Hazardous Products Board of Review, 
Testimony of Proceedings, Vol. 24, at pp. 157,169. 
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experience with design defects under Article 402A of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second). While the section apparently 
establishes strict product liability, its application in design defect 
cases will in many instances return the court to a negligence 
formula.31 The distinction between negligence and strict liability 
becomes difficult to formulate in a design defect case, and accord- 
ingly, the strict liability American case law may be applicable to a 
discussion of negligent design at least in Canada.32 American 
courts have developed two principal tests to determine whether a 
product has been defectively designed: a "consumer expectation" 
test and the application of risk-benefit analysis. The consumer 
expectation test, which has its historical and conceptual 
foundation in contract law,33 asks whether a consumer could 
reasonably expect the product to have the characteristics and 
qualities which allegedly constitute the product as "defective". If 
the answer is yes, then the product would not be unreasonably 
dangerous and defective.34 Most commentators view the use of 
this contractual anachronism as inappropriate in the case of 
products liability actions in connection with injuries suffered by 
non-purchasers and bystanders, by pre-literate children who may 
not have created expectations, by unsophisticated consumers, 
3' The introduction of a requirement of "unreasonable danger" in the Restatement has 
been criticized in so far as it may be taken as introducing negligence considerations into 
what was intended to be a strict liability concept. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Corp., 501 P. 2d 
1153 (1972); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. ,  573 P. 2d 443 (1978). See also F. J. 
Vandall, "Design Defect" in "Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict 
Liability", 43 Ohio State L.J. 61 (1982), at pp. 72-4; Keeton, "Products Liability - 
Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect", 10Cum.L. Rev. 293 (1979), at pp. 314-15; 
Keeton, "Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect", 5 St. M. L.J. 30 (1973); 
Hoenig, "Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is there a Better Approach", 8 
Sw.U.L.Rev. 109 (1976), at pp. 123-4 and 136-7. 
32 See J. A. Henderson, "Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: 
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus", 63 Minn. L.Rev. 773 (1979), at 
pp. 777-8; W. Kimble and R. 0. Lesher, Products Liability (1979), at p. 83. 
33 See M.D. Bernacchi, "A Behavioral Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The 
Importance of Analyzing Product Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation 
and Frustration", 47 Cinc. L.Rev. 43 (1978), at pp. 46,47; J. Wade, "On the Nature of 
Strict Tort Liability for Products", 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973), at pp. 833-4. 
34 Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,  230 N.W.2d 794 (1975), 
at p. 798. It is similar to the strict liability test recommended in the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Report on Products Liability (1979): 
"defective product" means a product that falls short of the standard that may 
reasonably be expected of it in all the circumstances. [See Draft Bill, s. I.] 
It is not clear whether this incorporates a subjective or objective test; or even if the issue 
is one of judicial or  consumer expectation. 
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and by users who do not have the necessary information to assess 
product risk.35 
A quite different approach is to attempt to formulate rules 
describing the level of danger which we, as a society, are willing 
to accept in the products which we, as individuals, use, consume 
or are exposed to:36 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user 
and to the public as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause 
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same 
need and not be as unsafe. 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the 
product without impairing its usefulness or  making it too expensive to 
maintain its utility. 
( 5 )  The users' ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of 
the product. 
( 6 )  The users' anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the 
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the 
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or 
instructions. 
(7) The feasibility on the part of the manufacturer of spreading the loss by 
setting the price of the product or  carrying liability insurance. 
The risk-benefit analysis, it is submitted, is indispensable to a 
design defect case whether it is brought under negligence or strict 
liabilit~.~' Its use, however, strains the trial process by forcing the 
35 See Wade, supra, footnote 33 at pp. 833-4; Montgomery and Owen, "Reflections on the 
Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products", 27 S.C.L. 
Rev. 803 (1976); Escola v.  Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), at pp. 
443-4. 
36 See Donahue, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, "The Technological Expert in Products 
Liability Litigation", 52 Tex. L.Rev. 1303 (1974), at p. 1307. 
A design defect action brought in New Brunswick under the Consumer Product 
Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1 will, it seems, utilize this analysis. 
Under s. 27 of the Act, a supplier of a consumer product is liable for consumer losses 
caused by a product that is "unreasonably dangerous . . . because of a defect in design, 
materials or workmanship". 
37 It is my impression, as I develop it later in my discussion of the Canadian design defect 
cases, that this analysis has been implicit in the adjudication of design defect cases in 
Canada. 
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court to engage in inquiries with which it may not be adequately 
equipped to deal. Most cases coming before the courts can be 
broken down into a series of more or less discrete issues, each of 
which can be solved independently. Such is not the case when a 
design defect case must be resolved by the court. The design 
defect presents a problem which Professor Fuller has described as 
"poly~entric".~~ The design review process cannot be segregated 
into a series of discrete, independent issues, each of which may be 
resolved without influencing the solution of the other issues. 
In a negligent design case, the court must, in effect, redesign 
the product. It must identify and value a myriad of factors, 
including the nature, severity and probability of danger, the 
utility of the product (perhaps to the public, as well as the individ- 
ual), aesthetics, function, adequacy of warnings, class of potential 
victims, alternate design possibilities, and the marginal cost of 
available risk reduction techniques - and somehow determine 
whether or not a product is "unreasonably dangerous" or perhaps 
is negligently designed. The question is, in its broadest terms, 
"what portion of society's limited resources are to be allocated to 
this product's safety, thereby leaving less to be devoted to other 
social objectives?" The risk-benefit process of design review 
strains both judicial resources and expertise. As well, the review 
of design is by definition a multilateral dispute, and it is not clear 
that Canadian courts are suited to assess the conflicting and 
shifting interests of the individuals and institutions necessarily 
affected by design review. At the very least the review process 
introduces considerable uncertainty into the product design 
process. 39 
The problem of unpredictability is a serious one. Values given 
to the risk-benefit criteria are difficult to quantify - the values of 
life, personal health and safety are obviously the clearest 
examples. Allocate high values to those benefits and extensive 
safety measures would be justified. Lower values would warrant 
38 L. Fuller, "Adjudication and the Rule of Law", Proceedings, American Society of 
International Law (1960-1961), at p. 1. See also Twerski, Weinstein, Donahue and 
Piehler, "Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process 
Standards", 55 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 347 (1980), at pp. 351-2. 
39 The judicial design review process may take into account and value factors which 
regulatory design review considers irrelevant, or perhaps values in the opposite direc- 
tion. Thus design review may interfere to some extent with national or provincial 
economic, social or distributive objectives and programmes. See Dawson v. Chrysler 
Corp.,  630 F.2d 950 (1980). 
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fewer precautions. As Richard Epstein has written, the cost- 
benefit analyses so far employed offer "no guidance on the 
proper choice of value for human life. Can a matter of recurrent 
importance in all personal injury cases be left to a jury which may 
not even be aware of its ex i~ t ence?"~~  
A possible solution to the unpredictability of the cost-benefit 
analysis would entail the selection of objective criteria against 
which defectiveness could be mea~ured.~l  The negligent manufac- 
turing case has its own objective test - the perfectly manufac- 
tured product serves as a model for comparison with the product 
which is the subject of the litigation. Similarly, the use of the 
consumer expectation test would result in significantly increased 
predictability, were this test simply to require the manufacturer 
to comply with government regulations or common practice in its 
design.42 While a consumer expectation test which makes 
compliance with custom conclusive or even presumptive proof of 
reasonable care would certainly increase predictability, it would 
necessarily involve substantial costs - "custom is like a two- 
edged sword . . . it preserves the useful adjustments of the past, 
while at the same time it hinders the progress of the future" and is 
"a barrier to all that might be better".43 There remains, as well, 
the risk that customary standards, especially if adopted through a 
consensus decision-making process in the industry, may reflect 
"the barest minimum of acceptability within the affected 
40 R. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law (1980), at p. 831. See also G. H. Mooney, 
The Valuation of Human Life (1977); M .  W. Jones-Lee, The Value of Life, An 
Economic Analysis (1976); Mooney, "Human Life and Suffering" in The Valuation of 
Social Cost, D. W. Pearce, ed. (1978); E. J. Mishan, Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
2nd ed. (1976), pp. 101-8. 
The judicial and statutory treatment of "life valuation" issues offers little guidance on 
this intractable question. See Woelk v .  Halvorson (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 385, [I9811 1 
W.W.R. 289 (S.C.C.) (allowing compensation for loss of assistance and comfort of 
husband under the Domestic Relations Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 113, s. 35 as amended by 
S.A. 1973, c. 61, s. 16, now R.S.A. 1980, c. D-37, s. 43). Compare Louis v. Esslinger 
(1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 17 at p. 24, [I9811 3 W.W.R. 350 at p. 360 (B.C.S.C.) (no 
recovery for non-pecuniary loss on death) and Leopold v. Knight; Phoenix Assurance 
Co. of Canada, Third Party (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 260,44 N.S. R. (2d) 654 (N.S.S.C. 
T.D.) (common law does not recognize grief as compensable head of damage), with 
Mason v .  Peters (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 417, 30 O.R. (2d) 409 (H.C.J.), affd 139 
D.L.R. (3d) 104,39 O.R. (2d) 27 (C.A.) (permitting recovery for loss of guidance, care 
and companionship if a pecuniary loss). 
41 See Texaco Ltd. v .  Mulberry Filling Station Ltd. , [I9721 1 All E. R. 513 (Ch.). 
42 Epstein, supra, footnote 40 at p. 82 and note 27. 
43 Bernard, Social Control in its Sociological Aspects (1939), pp. 554-5, cited in A. Linden, 
Canadian Negligence Law (Toronto, Buttenvorths, 1972), p. 57. 
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industry".44 "Custom", and "state of the art" defences, and they 
are not i d e n t i ~ a l , ~ ~  confront the court with still another dilemma 
- to what extent should their legal rules incorporate "tech- 
nology-pushing" concepts?46 
The reasoning and level of analysis employed by Canadian 
judges in negligent design cases are more or less reflected in the 
words of Mr. Justice Hallett of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
when he concluded that a product sold to an injured plaintiff was 
either negligently designed or manufactured: "The precautions 
taken by the defendant . . . failed for one reason or another. The 
situation speaks for itself '.47 Canadian courts have seldom 
admitted the existence of difficult design cases, and accordingly, 
"reasoning" similar to that used by Hallett J. has sufficed in the 
few reported Canadian design defect cases.48 In addition, two 
44 See W. P. Keeton, D.  Owen and J .  E. Montgomery, Product Liability and Safety 
(1980), p. 373. 
45 The Ontario Law Reform Commission, in its Report on Products Liability (1979), seems 
to assimilate the two concepts. Ibid., at p. 95. See also S. Waddams, Products Liability, 
2nd ed. (Toronto, Carswell Co. Ltd., 1980), p. 47. 
Generally prevailing standards or "custom" refers to the current manufacturing or 
commercial practices employed by participants in the industry. See Epstein, supra, 
footnote 40 at p. 74. Conversely, "state of the art", refers to the "level of pertinent 
scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time". See L. Frumer and M. 
Friedman, Products Liability, Vol. 1 (1978), para. 6.05[15]. The distinction is reflected 
in the reasoning of Linden J. in Brunski v .  Dominion Stores Ltd. (1982), 20 C.C.L.T. 14 
(Ont. H.C.J.), at p. 23. 
46 Even if one were to look only at "state of the art" as a relevant concept in design defect 
review one must still decide whether to use "state of the art" at the time of product 
supply, o r  the time of injury. See Keeton, "Products Liability - Design Hazards and 
the Meaning of Defect", 10 Cum. L. Rev. 293 (1979). Keeton suggests that the risk- 
benefit evaluation should take into account "the magnitude of the scientifically 
perceivable danger as it is proved at the time of trial". Ibid., at pp. 37, 38. The same 
view has been advocated by others, including J. Wade, supra, footnote 33, and 
Schwartz, "Foreward: Understanding Products Liability", 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435 (1979), 
at p. 488. 
47 Murphy v .  Atlantic Speedy Propane Ltd. (1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at p. 553, 35 
N.S.R. (2d) 422 at p. 431. 
48 See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, [I9741 
S.C.R. 1189. This judgment was based upon the duty to warn of a hazard. See also Ives 
v. Clare Brothers Ltd. (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 519, [I9711 1 O.R. 417 (H.C.J.); 
Edmonton Flying Club v. Northward Aviation Ltd. (1979), 17 A.R. 507 (C.A.), at p. 
518; Phillips v .  Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 28, [I9701 2 
O.R.  714 (H.C.J.), revd on other grounds 18 D.L.R. (3d) 641, [I9711 2 O.R. 637 
(C.A.); Malat v. Bjornson, [I9781 5 W.W.R. 429,6 C.C.L.T. 142 (B.C.S.C.), affd 114 
D.L.R. (3d) 612, 23 B.C.L.R. 235 (C.A.). See also Smith v .  Inglis Ltd. (1978), 83 
D.L.R. (3d) 215, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 38 (S.C. App. Div.); Lambert v .  Lewis, [I9801 2 
W.L.R. 299 (C.A.), revd [I9811 1 All E.R. 1185 (H.L.); Adelaide Chemical and Ferri- 
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cases have emphasized the importance of the "state of the art" 
and accepted industry practice (or custom) as relevant criteria in 
determining whether or not a product is negligently de~igned.~9 
More recently, both custom and state of the art arguments appar- 
ently influenced Linden J. in Brunski v. Dominion Stores Ltd., in 
which the design of a glass bottle was under review.50 One 
potential difficulty with using either state of the art or common 
practice as a criterion for determining defective design is that it 
allows an industry to create an artificially "retarded" state of the 
art by purposefully failing to undertake the research necessary to 
increase the safety of its products, or by creating a common 
practice by failing to develop or implement new technological 
advances. 51 
One issue which deserves mention, especially in light of the 
post-transaction acquisition of information regarding UFFI risks, 
is the time at which the "state of the art" is to be determined; and 
associated with that issue, the time at which the relevant 
knowledge of the risks is to be ascertained. The general view 
would seem to be that in the case of negligent design review in 
tort, the time of product distribution is critical both in the context 
of knowledge of "risk reduction techniques", and in the context 
of information about product risks.52 The view in contract law 
would seem, however, to be the opposite,53 which may have 
significant implications in the case of the statutory implied 
lizer Co. Ltd. v. Carlyle (1940), 64 C.L.R. 520; Willis v. FMC Machinery and Chemicals 
Ltd.(1976),68D.L.R.(3d)127,11Nfld.&P.E.I.R.361(P.E.I.S.C.). 
49 The London & Lancashire Guarantee & Accident Company of Canada v. La Cie F.X. 
Drolet, [I9441 1 D.L.R. 561 at p. 568, [I9441 S.C.R. 82 at pp. 90-1. 
50 Supra, footnote 45 at p. 554. 
51 See Murphy v. Atlantic Speedy Propane Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 47. At the same time, the 
"common practice" defence is subject to the manufacturer being held to the standard of 
an expert in his field. See cases at footnote 85, infra. 
52 See Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at p. 47; Brunski v. Dominion Stores Ltd. ,  supra, 
footnote 45. 
53 See Henry KendaN & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd. ,  [I9691 2 A.C. 31 (H.L.), at 
pp. 75 and 108-9; Frost v. The Aylesbury Dairy Co., Ltd., [I9051 1 K . B .  608 (C.A.). 
Liability in contract will be imposed even if the defect could not have been discovered 
without destructive testing. See Sigurdson v. Hillcrest Service Ltd. (1976), 73 D.L.R. 
(3d) 132, [I9771 1 W. W.R. 740 (Sask. Q.B.). Compare J. Henderson, "Coping with the 
Time Dimension in Products Liability", 69 Cal. L.Rev. 919 (1981), at note 19. 
11 -4  C.B.L.J. 
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warranty action against non-direct suppliers which may be 
available in Saskatchewad4 and New B r u n ~ w i c k . ~ ~  
It seems that, in Canada, while compliance with government 
standards or safety certification of a product is a relevant factor in 
demonstrating reasonable care in product design, it is not 
c o n c l ~ s i v e . ~ ~  Finally, one negligence case has set out explicitly, 
albeit in an unsophisticated manner, the risk-benefit analysis 
which it considered should be employed in determining the 
adequacy of product design.57 
A reading of the negligent design cases demonstrates quite 
convincingly that Canadian courts generally do not set out the 
reasoning behind their judgments concerning defectively 
designed products, perhaps because they have not been faced 
with a challenging, complex case,58 or perhaps because they intui- 
tively appreciate the conceptual difficulties, and irreconcilable 
normative conflicts inherent in any case of design review. Admit- 
tedly, design review necessarily involves a substantial element of 
normative judgment, no matter how sophisticated the analysis of 
54 See the Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, ss. 11.4, 13(2). 
However, it may be argued that a manufacturer of urea formaldehyde components is not 
a manufacturer of a consumer product as that term is defined ins. 2(e) of the Act. See L. 
Romero, "The Consumer Products Warranties Act", 43 Sask. L.R. 81 (1978-79), at p. 
111. 
The New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. 
C-18.1 also provides for an implied warranty action which could be brought by 
consumers against sellers of formaldehyde foam. While privity of contract is abolished 
under s. 23 of the Act in respect of consumer losses, it would seem that component 
chemical manufacturers would not come within the definition of seller in s. 1. See K. J. 
Dore, "The Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act", 31 U.N.B.L.J. 161 (1982). 
55 The Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, supra, s. 27(1), (4). See also 
Henderson, supra, footnote 53 at pp. 928-31. Again, however, the action would seem to 
be available only against suppliers of a consumer product which might exclude 
component part manufacturers. 
56 See Willis v .  FMC Machinery and Chemicals Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 48 (government 
certification of pesticide not determinative in design negligence); Paskivski v. Canadian 
Pacific Ltd. (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 280 at p. 285, [I9761 1 S.C.R. 687 at p. 698; C. N. R. 
v. Vincent (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 663, [I9791 1 S.C.R. 364. 
57 Edmonton Flying Club v .  Northward Aviation Ltd . ,  supra, footnote 48 at pp. 525-6. See 
also Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow and Honsberger (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at p. 110, 
[I9741 S.C.R. 239 at p. 247; Dziwenka v. The Queen in right of Alberta (1971), 25 
D.L.R. (3d) 12, [I9721 S.C.R. 419; Stermer v. Lawson (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 366, 
[I9771 5 W.W.R. 628 (B.C. S.C.), vard 107 D.L.R. (3d) 36, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 92 
(B.C.C.A.). 
58 For examples of complex cases, see Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,  577 P.2d 1322 
(1978); Garst v .  General Motors Corp.,  484 P.2d 47 (1971); Twiner v. .General Motors 
Corp.,  514 S.W.2d 497 (1974); Kropp v .  Douglas Aircraft C o . ,  329 F .  Supp. 447 (1971). 
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the problem. As mentioned above, one cannot pretend to 
balance the cost of lives against the cost of improving the safety of 
a product by employing a pseudo-scientific formula. At the very 
least, it is important that the factors which the court considers to 
be relevant in determining whether or not a product is reasonably 
safe be explicitly defined. 
Negligent design cases generally involve the analysis of either 
the structure59 of an object or the design of p r o ~ e d u r e . ~ ~  The urea 
formaldehyde foam design case, however, does not fit into either 
of these categories. The urea formaldehyde manufacturer 
designed and sold chemical components and patented a 
procedure6' through which the components would be transformed 
into insulation. Whether or not the final product was an "unrea- 
sonably dangerous" product depends as much upon the design 
and performance of the installation procedures as it does upon 
the quality of the components. Thus, the question of whether 
urea formaldehyde foam is negligently designed can only be 
answered by asking questions about the insulation product's 
performance characteristics and the design of its installation 
procedures: 
(a) Was there sufficient testing of the installation process, 
procedures, and end product? 
(b )  Was the on-site manufacture and installation of the foam 
so sensitive to environmental factors as not to be a viable 
procedure? 
(c)  Did the foam present a danger to health even when it was 
"perfectly" installed? 
(d) Was proper provision made for the storage and timely use 
of the component parts? 
(e) Were installers adequately trained and were they 
sufficiently skilled to mix and install properly the foam? 
u> Since the on-site mixing and installation of urea formal- 
dehyde foam were two of the most vital phases of 
production, were the manufacturers negligent in allowing 
independent contractors to take charge of these phases? 
(I.e., was the distribution system designed negligently?) 
59 See cases, supra, at footnote 48. 
60See Chasney v .  Anderson, [I9501 4 D.L .R.  223 (surgeon negligent in failing to use 
surgical sponges with tapes attached, a procedure which would have prevented sponges 
being left in patient). 
61 See supra, footnote 8. 
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(g) Should the manufacturers have developed effective 
remedial measures before marketing the product? 
Any attempt to establish legal responsibility on component 
chemical manufacturers, which looks to the defective design of a 
consumer product (in this case foam insulation), will be met by 
the argument that the component manufacturers did not 
manufacture a consumer product which allegedly caused the 
loss.62 Rather they manufactured chemicals and sold them to a 
third party who manufactured a consumer product from the 
chemicals. A supplier of raw materials, which themselves are not 
"defective", cannot be held responsible when those materials are 
used in the negligent manufacture of a product by a subsequent 
manufacturer which causes injury to the These 
arguments may be met by establishing liability on the component 
chemical manufacturer for the design of the foam manufacturing 
process, which was patented in the manufacturer's name. The 
distributorship agreement entered into by at least one component 
chemical manufacturer grants the right to distribute the foam 
system - it does not simply involve the supply of component 
 chemical^.^^ The negligence in design consists of the design of a 
manufacturing process which was used to produce a product 
which may be unreasonably d a n g e r ~ u s . ~ ~  The liability of 
6'While manufacturers of component parts have been found liable in design negligence 
cases, it is clear that the "component" was an independent, pre-existing physical object 
which is simply incorporated or added to another object. See Evans v.  Triplex Safety 
Glass Co. Ltd., [I9361 1 All E.R. 283 (K.B.); City of Franklin v.  Badger Ford Truck 
Sales, Inc., 207 N. W. 2d 866 (1973); Clark v.  Bendix Corp.,  345 N.Y .S. 2d 662 (1973); 
d'Hedunville v.  Pioneer Hotel C o . ,  552 F .  2d 886 (1977); Union Supply Co. v.  Pust, 583 
P. 2d 276 (1978); Restatement of Torts (Second), s. 402A, comment p, and comment q. 
63 Several American cases make this point, as does the Restatement of Torts (Second), s. 
402A, comment p. See Parker v. Warren, 503 S.W. 2d 938 (1974); Walker v. Stauffer 
Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1971); Taylor v.  Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F .  2d 145 
(1975); Temple v. Wean United, Inc. 364 N . E .  2d 267 (1967); Elliot v. Century Chevrolet 
Co . ,  597 S.W. 2d 563 (1980). 
M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [I9321 A.C. 562 (H.L.), at p. 599. Admittedly, 
the requirement is not absolute. See Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at pp. 56-8; Smith v.  
Inglis Ltd. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 215,25 N.S.R. (2d) 38 (S.C. App. Div.); Shields v. 
Hobbs Manufacturing Co. (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 307 (S.C.C.). 
@ See Distributor Agreement, Insulspray Urea Formaldehyde Foam System, between 
Borden Chemical Canada and Versachem Corporation, July 19,1976 (on file at Faculty 
of Law, University of British Columbia). 
65This issue may also be analyzed as a case of vicarious liability for the tons of 
independent contractors engaged in an activity which may be expected to cause injury. 
In such a case the principal must ensure that reasonable steps are taken to prevent 
injury. Wilby v. Savage, [I9531 4 D.L.R. 319,32 M.P.R. 63 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.), affd 
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component part manufacturers, when it has been suggested that 
they are responsible to end users notwithstanding substantial 
modification of a component part, seems to focus on the ability of 
the component manufacturer to know of and perhaps control the 
use and design of the end product.66 
The application of design defect analysis to the design of the 
urea formaldehyde manufacturing process will take into account 
the risks to health and safety presented by the product and known 
to the industry in 1975;67 the existence of alternative insulation 
products which performed the same or a similar function as 
formaldehyde foam;68 the ability to reduce or eliminate the 
dangerous characteristics of the product;69 the ability to control 
the quality of the product produced on site;70 the extent of 
product testing and research in respect of health risks carried out 
by the designers of the manufacturing process; and knowledge of 
the probability, nature and extent of personal injury, property 
damage and repair costs.'l The review of design adequacy is, 
[I9541 3 D.L.R. 204, [I9541 S.C.R. 376; Vojvodan v. Woods, (19771 2 C.C.L.T. 86; 
Custom Ceilings Inc. v. S .  W.  Fleming & Co. Ltd. (1970), 12 D.L.R.(3d) 209, [I9701 3 
O.R. 17 (H.C.J.). 
An argument can be made that the manufacturers cannot argue that the activities of 
the installers constituted an intervening negligent act which absolves the former from 
liability. The cases suggest that the issue will, to a large degree, depend upon the 
foreseeability of the negligent intervention. See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., 
[I9701 2 All E.R. 294 (H.L.); Harris v. Toronto Transit Commission (1967), 63 D.L.R. 
(2d) 450 at p. 455, [I9671 S.C.R. 460 at p. 465. See also A. Linden, Canadian Tort Law 
(Toronto, Buttenvorths, 1977), pp. 341-3; Edmonton Flying Club v. Northward 
Aviation Ltd., supra, footnote 48 at p. 527. 
66 See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), at p. 272; Walker v. Stauffer 
Chem. Corp., supra, footnote 63 at p. 806; Kasel v .  Remington Arms Co. Inc., 101 Cal. 
Rptr. 314 (1972), at p. 322. 
b7 See introduction, supra, at footnote 12. The question as to the time at which one looks 
at the state of industry knowledge would seem to be the time of product distribution. 
See supra, footnote 46. 
68 It seems that several other products were and are available which were equally suitable 
for use as a residential retrofit insulation product. Canadian Home Insulation Program, 
Material List, effective September 26, 1979, Hazardous Products Board of Review, 
Exhibit 219A. 
69 The consensus appears to be that foam insulation, even when installed under laboratory 
conditions will emit levels of formaldehyde well above the levels associated with 
irritation and other health problems. See Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra, 
footnote 6 at 14402. 
70The ability to minimize the release of formaldehyde fumes is directly related to the 
quality of foam produced, which is, in turn, dependent upon a number of "application 
parameters", identified in 1977 as including: the quality of the ingredients; the ratios of 
the ingredients; the mixing of the ingredients; the viscosities of the ingredients; the age 
and shelf life of the ingredients; and the temperature at which the foaming takes place. 
71 Given a general lack of knowledge about the characteristics and performance of urea 
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however, in its infancy in Canada, and it would be premature to 
predict the outcome of the review of the design of formaldehyde 
foam insulation. 72 
(2) Failure to Warn 
A second possible source of legal responsibility of both 
component manufacturers and installers may be based on the 
failure of those enterprises to warn users of the risks associated 
with the foam. The courts have recognized that accidents, 
personal injury, and property damage may be reduced both in the 
sense that information may permit assumption of risk and price 
modification as part of the transacting process (and thus eliminate 
the "accident" through a risk assumption analysis), and in the 
sense that information may reduce the actual incidence of injury 
during the time when the product is in use. The apparent benefits 
of product information, whether through warnings or instructions 
for use, include a reduction in search costs,73 the non-occurrence 
formaldehyde foam, it is important to  note that one of the largest component chemical 
manufacturers apparently undertook very little research into the foam's performance 
and safety characteristics. See Testimony of B. Wood, General Sales Manager, Borden 
Chemical, Hazardous Products Board of Review, Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 25 at 
pp. 63-111. 
See also W. J. Rossiter et al . ,  "Urea-Formaldehyde Based Insulations: An 
Assessment of Their Properties and Performance", United States Dept. of Commerce, 
National Bureau of Standards, Technical Note 946, at pp. 8-9. The National Bureau of 
Standards concluded that "no means of assuring the level of quality of urea-formal- 
dehyde based foams" existed. Ibid., at p. 5 .  
'2 In July, 1977, data on the durability of urea formaldehyde foam insulation and its 
propensity to release formaldehyde fumes was generally contradictory or inadequate. 
The report submitted to the United States National Bureau of Standards stated that, 
while properties of density, mechanical strength and water absorption are determined: 
for other performance properties there are insufficient data available from which 
performance may be adequately evaluated: effect of foam on other building 
materials; resistance of the foam to freezing and thawing; water vapor transmis- 
sion; effect of absorbed water on the thermal conductivity of the foam; maximum 
service temperature; effect of high temperature and high humidity. [See Rossiter, 
supra, footnote 71 at pp. 8-9.1 
73 It is possible to argue that product information supplied by suppliers of goods will 
substantially reduce the aggregate search costs which consumers must incur in order to 
assess comparative risks. See R. Hirschhorn, A Case Study: Energy Consumption 
Labelling Requirements for Refrigerators, Policy Co-ordination Branch, Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs Canada (1979), at p. 10. The reduction in search costs is, however, 
subject to certain constraints. The obligation to disclose information should only extend 
to the point where the marginal cost of information acquisition and transfer costs equal 
the marginal benefit of the information to  the consumer. 
The consumer will be prepared to pay for information only to the point where the 
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of the accident where the consumer has purchased the product 
with knowledge of the risks,74 an improvement in resource 
allocation in consumer decision-making,75 and the modification of 
post-transaction behaviour so as to reduce the incidence of 
accidents,76 or to permit amelioration of the consequences of the 
accident through insurance. 
The assumption which the courts seem to make is that the 
producer of the good is often in a position to acquire and disse- 
minate information about the product at a lower marginal cost 
than a product user. The supplier may have already invested 
resources in obtaining information about the product in the 
marginal cost of information acquisition as to  price and non-price terms does not exceed 
the expected benefits of further search costs. See Stigler, "The Economics of Informa- 
tion", 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961); McGall, "The Economics of Information and 
Optimal Shopping Rules", 38 J. Bus. 300 (1965). 
74 See J. Guss, "Product Quality - A Multidisciplinary Policy Perspective" in The New 
Consumer Protection Act of Quebec, Meredith Memorial Lectures (1979), p. 159. 
This view is reflected in the definition of a defective good which focuses on conformity 
with consumer expectation. So long as the product conforms to the expectations of the 
consumer, the product is not defective, and compensation is denied. See Ontario Law 
Reform Commission, Report on Products Liability (1979), at pp. 13, 80. This view 
assumes that consumers are willing to  except a sum of money in return for exposure to 
an additional risk of personal injury. On this basis, the additional risk of personal 
injury, when disclosed through a warning, "takes its place as one of a number of 
economic consequences" which affect product users. See E. J. Mishan, Elements of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2nd ed. (1976), p. 104. The reaction of the individual once the 
risk has occurred, no matter how terrible, is irrelevant: 
Person A, for example may find himself disabled for life and rue his decision to 
take the risk. But this is only a painful reminder of the fact that people come to 
regret a great many choices they make. [See Mishan, ibid., at p. 108.1 
The issue is not a concern with reduction in injuries, but resource allocation. The 
issue arises in the case of the duty to warn patients of the risks of adverse drug reactions. 
See Crossman v. Stewart (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 677, 5 C.C.L.T. 45 (B.C.S.C.) The 
disclosure may not in fact reduce the risk of injury to  the plaintiff, especially where 
knowledge of the risk does not permit the doctor or the patient to undertake steps to 
reduce the incidence of injury. The concern is one of informed consent, and the function 
of the information is to permit the product user to  determine if he is willing to assume 
the risk concomitant to using the drug. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donahue and Piehler, 
"The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability", 61 Cor. L. Rev. 495 (1976). 
75 Another way of making the same point is to argue that information is relevant to 
consumer choice, and that the lack of information about a product and its properties 
may well result in a misallocation of resources by the consumer. Where consumers 
misperceive the benefits or costs of a transaction, the decision to obtain the good based 
on imperfect information will result in a loss in consumer welfare through a sub-optimal 
decision. See S. Peltzman, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 
1962 Drug Amendments", 81 J. of Pol. Econ. 1049 (1973); K. Lancaster, "A New 
Approach to Consumer Theory", J. of Pol. Econ. 132 (1966). 
76 s e e  Clarke v. Army and N ~ V ~ C O - o p e r a t i v e  Society, ~ r d . ,  [i903] 1 K.B. 155 (C.A.), at 
pp. 161,167. 
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course of product development and marketing. As well, 
economies of scale will often permit the product supplier to 
collect and disseminate information at a lower marginal cost than 
the user.77 A third judicial assumption is that less than an optimal 
level of information about product characteristics may be 
generated by the market.78 In many cases, the supplier of the 
information cannot realize the full value of his investment in 
producing the information, as potential users need not disclose 
their willingness to pay for the good, and the supplier may not be 
able to charge for the inf~rmation.'~ Because the supplier of 
information cannot divide his product and transfer it to willing 
buyers at a price, the information tends to be underproduced. 
Equally important, the information, once produced, can, and 
perhaps should be distributed and reproduced at an extremely 
low cost. Of course, the information will not be distributed to this 
degree by suppliers who cannot charge the potential users enough 
to cover their production costs. Finally, underproduction of 
information is exacerbated where, in the case of information 
which would reduce the price that potential buyers would be 
willing to pay for the good, the private costs of information 
disclosure will almost certainly preclude a voluntary decision to 
transfer the information by a supplier.80 
The result of these points has been the judicial imposition of a 
legal obligation to disclose information to product users - the 
duty to warn is a subset of a broader legal obligation encom- 
passing aspects of contractual warranties, negligent misrepresen- 
tation and unconscionability. For the purposes of discussion the 
duty to warn may be described as the obligation to disclose 
information as to the existence of product hazards,81 and to 
77 See J .  F. Bany, "The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lob-5", 129 U. 
Penn. L.Rev. 1307 (1981), at p. 1323; Nelson, "Advertising as Information", 82 J. of 
Pol. Econ. 729 (1974); Hendon, The Economic Effects of Advertising (1976), p. 39. 
78 This informational failure is one of the primary rationales for government intervention 
. in consumer transactions in an effort to correct market imperfections resulting from 
inadequate information. The lack of information will often result in under or over-utili- 
zation of resources. See Mantador and Baumann, Government Intervention in the 
Marketplace and the Case for Social Regulation, Treasury Branch Secretariat (1977), p. 
7. 
79 See R. Musgrove, The Theory of Public Finance (1959), p. 80. 
80 See T. Kronman, "Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts", 2 J. of 
Leg. Stud. 1 (1978); D. W. Noel and J. J. Phillips, Products Liability, 2nd ed. (1982), p. 
468; Heutschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F .  2d 102 (1954). 
Hazards refers to risks of personal injury o r  property damage. Whether the duty to  warn 
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inform potential users of the means to avoid unsafe use of the 
product.g2 In some cases, the latter obligation is assimilated to a 
duty to provide adequate instructions, which will be analyzed in 
the same manner as the duty to warn.g3 
The duty to disclose information relating to hazards, unless it is 
coupled with an objective standard of knowledge, may simply 
reduce the incentives to suppliers to acquire information which 
requires an investment of  resource^.^^ Accordingly, the courts 
have established that suppliers must disclose information about 
which they ought to have known,gs and manufacturers will be held 
to have constructive knowledge of experts in the industry.g6 The 
obligation applies to transactions involving the supply of 
services,g7 as well as productsgg and perhaps the supply of design 
processes.g9 
can be extended to economic risks is problematical. Where the alleged failure to warn of 
economic risks arises in a "direct" relationship, the issue is usually discussed in terms of 
contract o r  negligent misrepresentation. 
82 The purpose of the disclosure of risks is not simply to  permit accurate pricing of goods; 
it is to influence post-transactional behaviour so as to reduce the incidence of accidents. 
Accordingly, information about the nature and extent of the risks and how they might 
be avoided may have to be disclosed. See Ruegger v. Shell Oil Co. of Canada Ltd. 
(1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 183, [I9641 1 O.R. 88 (H.C.J.); K. Ross, "Legal and Practical 
Considerations for the Creation of Warning Labels and Instruction Books", 4 J. of 
Prod. Liab. 29 (1981), at p. 39. 
83 Midgley v.  S.S. Kresge Co. ,  55 Cal.App. 3d 67 (1976) (manufacturer liable for failure to 
warn of dangers associated with incorrect assembly of product); Austin v.  3M Canada 
Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 656,7 O.R. (2d) 200 (Co. Ct.). 
s4 See Kronman, supra, footnote 80. 
8s Ruegger v. Shell Oil Co. of Canada, supra, footnote 82; Labrecque v. Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool (1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at p. 303, [I9771 6 W.W.R. 122 at p. 140 (Sask. 
Q.B.), appeal allowed in part 110 D.L.R. (3d) 686, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 558 (Sask. C.A.); 
Cominco Ltd. v.  Westinghouse Canada Ltd. (1982), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 544 (B.C.S.C.), at 
p. 572, vard 147 D.L.R. (3d) 279 (B.C.C.A.); Lem v. Barotto Sports Ltd. (1976), 69 
D.L.R. (3d) 276 at p. 287,l  A.R. 556 at pp. 574-5 (S.C. App. Div.). 
s6 See cases, supra, at footnote 85. Associated with the imposition of constructive 
knowledge is the imposition of a legal obligation to  acquire knowledge through research 
and development. See Willis v.  FMC Machinery & Chemicals Ltd. (1976), 68 D.L.R. 
(3d)127,11Nfld.&P.E.I.R.361(P.E.I.S.C.).  
87 Senkiew v. Lachuta (1981), 11 Man. R. (2d) 444 (Q.B.); McNeil v.  Village Locksmith 
Ltd. (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 543 at p. 546,35 O.R. (2d) 50 at p. 52 (H.C.J.); Gold v.  
Servicemaster of Calgary Ltd. (1977), 6 A.R. 248 (Dist. Ct.). 
The duty to warn has been applied to the supply of goods as a matter of course, the 
degree of care expected of the supplier varying with the degree of hazard represented by 
the product. However, there is some suggestion that the duty to warn will be applied 
only when the goods are of themselves of a hazardous nature. See Ivan v.  Aoco Ltd. 
(1980), 5 Sask. R. 78 (C.A.), at p. 80. 
89 The issue in this case, as in the case of an alleged design defect, is the extent to which 
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The structure of the formaldehyde industry and the nature of 
the UFFI manufacturing process suggest that the formaldehyde 
product liability case is unusual in that the focus of liability is the 
failure to warn by manufacturers of components from which a 
consumer product is manufactured on site by another commercial 
enterprise. There is little doubt that the duty to warn applies to 
the installerYg0 but the responsibility of component manufacturers 
is less clear.91 Where a. product is supplied by a manufacturer 
through an intermediate party to ultimate users, information 
disclosure will often be most effective if the manufacturer 
transfers information to the intermediate, who can then take 
steps to reduce the risk through further warnings, or who may be 
able to negotiate the allocation of the risk with the ultimate 
user.92 The question, then, is whether the component manufac- 
turer need go further and warn users of products which he does 
not manufacture. 
The accident reduction function of warnings to intermediate 
distributors is premised on the distributors adopting measures to 
inform end users, or to negotiate risk allocation. Where this will 
not take place, it is arguable that the warning is not an effective 
accident reduction technique, and the manufacturer must take 
steps to disseminate information directly to the consumer.93 
component manufacturers will be held liable for failing to warn product users of risks 
associated with use of a product manufactured by an intermediate using their 
components. 
See supra, footnote 87. 
91 It is true, of course, that manufacturers of unaltered products may be under a duty of 
care to ultimate users. See Ivan v. Aoco Ltd., supra, footnote 88; Setrakov Construction 
Ltd. v.  Winder's Storage & Distributors Ltd. (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 301, 11 Sask. R. 
286 (C.A.); Rivtow Marine Ltd. v.  Washington Iron Works (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, 
[I9741 S.C.R. 1189; Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. Ltd. (1971), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 
121, [I9721 S.C.R. 569. 
92 For both these reasons the courts, on several occasions have held that manufacturers of 
products owe a duty of care to ultimate consumers, to inform intermediate parties of the 
risks associated with product use. See Holmes v. Ashford, [I9501 2 All E.R. 76 (C.A.); 
Albert, Savoie, Savoie and Wishart v.  Breau and Drummond Industries Ltd. (Third 
Party) and C.I.L. (Fourth Party) (1977), 19 N.B.R. (2d) 476 (S.C. Q.B. Div.); Parker 
v.  010x0, Ltd. [I9371 3 All E.R. 524; Gravis v.  Parke, Davis & C o . ,  502 S.W.2d 863 
(1973), at p. 868; Davis v.  Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F. 2d 121 (1968); R. A. 
Merrill, "Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries", 59 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1973), at p. 
8. 
93 S. A. Liccardo, "Consumers' Right to Know: A New Horizon in Drug Product Liabili- 
ty", J.  of Prod. Liab. 165 (1977); Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final 
Report of the Legal Study, Vol. I1 (1977), pp. 73-5; Davis v.  Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 
supra, footnote 92; Jackson v .  Coast Paint and Lacquer C o . ,  499 F. 2d 809 (1974). 
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There are, however, a number of cases which suggest that 
manufacturers are under no legal duty to warn ultimate 
consumers where the product will be applied by an intermediate 
party,94 or where the manufacturer is a component part 
man~fac tu r e r .~~  The better view is that, at least in some cases, 
manufacturers of products which will be applied or installed by an 
intermediate party, are under a legal duty of care to disclose risks 
to both the intermediate party and the ultimate user.96 The 
question, of course, is whether manufacturers of component 
chemicals which are transformed into a consumer product, should 
be under a similar legal obligation to warn end users of risks that 
may arise from the failure of the product manufacturer to 
produce a non-defective product. The intervening activity of the 
product manufacturer may be considered as an entirely 
independent source of legal re~ponsibili ty.~~ 
The requirement that a component manufacturer disclose risks 
to ultimate consumers should be imposed, it seems, when the 
disclosure will permit the consumer to make a more accurate 
purchase decision, and where the information will reduce the 
incidence, severity and consequences of accidents. While inform- 
ation disclosure to intermediate parties may contribute to those 
objectives, to the degree that intermediate party disclosure is 
ineffective, there seems to be no logical or functional reason to 
Several cases in Canada and Australia have adopted this rationale. See Streets Ice 
Cream v.  Australian Asbestos, [I9671 1 N.S.W.R. 50 (S.C.); Good-Wear Treaders Ltd. 
v.  D & B Holdings Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 59 at pp. 67-8,31 N.S.R. (2d) 380 at p. 
392 sub nom. Murphy v. D & B Holdings (N.S.S.C. App. Div.) per MacKeigan 
C.J.N.S. 
94 See Holmes v.  Ashford, supra, footnote 92; Albert, Savoie, Savoie and Wishart v. Breau 
and Drummond Industries Ltd. (Third Party) and C.I.L. (Fourth Party), supra, 
footnote 92. 
95 See Jones v.  City of Calgary (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 455,67 W.W.R. 589 (Alta. S.C.). 
96 See Wright v.  Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. (1972), 13 K.I.R. 255; Stermer v. Lawson 
(1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 366 at pp. 373-4, [I9771 5 W. W.R. 628 at p. 636 (B.C.S.C.), vard 
107 D.L.R. (3d) 36, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 92 (B.C.S.C.); Ruegger v.  Shell Oil Co. of 
Canada, supra, footnote 82 at p. 193 D.L.R., p. 98 O.R.; Pack v .  County of Warner No. 
5, Michelson (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 215, 46 W.W.R. 422 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.); 
Lavoie v.  Poitras Gas & Oil Ltd. and Terry Burner Inc. (1979), 28 N.B.R. (2d) 541 
(C.A.) (duty on oil tank manufacturer to warn end user of risk of gasoline leakage). 
Phillips v.  Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 28, [I9701 2 0 .R.  714 
(C.A.), revd on other grounds 18 D.L.R. (3d) 641, [I9711 2 O.R. 637 (C.A.). 
97 See Good-Wear Treaders Ltd. v. D & B Holdings Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 93 at pp. 69-70 
D.L.R., p. 394 N.S.R.; Schmitz v.  Stoveld, MacNaughton-Brooks Ltd., Third Party 
(1974), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 615 at pp. 624-5,11 O.R. (2d) 17 at pp. 24-5 (Co. Ct.), leave to 
appeal to Court of Appeal refused, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 615n (C. A.). 
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exempt component manufacturers from responsibility to disclose 
risks to end users. The only points which should be acknowledged 
are, first, that the component manufacturer may in some cases be 
able to seek contribution from the intermediate party, while in 
other cases, the component manufacturer might be held respon- 
sible for the negligence of the in~tal1er;~g and second, that the 
court must assess the benefits of direct warnings against the feasi- 
bility and cost of information transfer where the "product" is not 
in existence when the manufacturer distributes the component 
chemicals. 
The imposition of an obligation to disclose information is not 
the creation of strict liability for inaccurate information or failure 
to warn.99 While it is true that information disclosure regulation 
(the duty to warn) dispenses with the need to draw artificial lines 
between defective and non-defective goods, or between goods 
which are reasonably or unreasonably dangerous,loO the court 
must still assess whether the information provider "ought to have 
transferred the information", or put another way, whether the 
98 See Darlington v. Mobran Sales Ltd. (1981), 12 Man.R. (2d) 199 (Co. Ct.), at p. 209 
(importer under a duty to consumer to ensure that dealers were not negligent where 
importers know or ought to know of possible negligence). At best the issue will be one 
of contributory negligence. See Haynes v. Harwood, [I9351 1 K.B. 146 (C.A.), at p. 
156; Smith v. Inglis Ltd. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 215, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 38 (S.C. App. 
Div.). 
99 As noted by many writers, the imposition of a duty to disclose "perfect" information is 
neither desirable nor possible. From one perspective, it is arguable that the supplier 
should only acquire and transfer information to the point that the marginal cost of 
information acquisition and transfer are equal to the marginal benefits of the inform- 
ation to the consumer. See Stigler, "The Economics of Information", 69 J. of Pol. 
Econ. 213 (1961); M. J .  Trebilcock, "Economic Criteria of Unconscionability", Study 
11 in B. J.  Reiter and J.  Swan, eds., Studies in Contract Law (Toronto, Butterworths, 
1980), pp. 408-9. 
In addition, the ability of consumers to process information effectively may deteri- 
orate where more information is transferred. See D. Cohen, "Comment on The Plain 
English Movement", 6 C.B.L.J. 421 (1981-82), at pp. 428-9; Jacoby, Speller and Kohn, 
"Brand Choice as a Function of Information Load", 11 J .  Mktg. Res. 63 (1974); M. 
Blakeney and S. Barnes, "Advertising Regulation in Australia An Evaluation", 8 
Adelaide L.R. 29 (1982), at pp. 30-2; A. Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The 
Dynamics of Coercive Collection", 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970), at p. 33. 
'00 See Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. Ltd.,  supra, footnote 91; Lem v.  Barotto 
Sports Ltd.,  supra, footnote 85; Rae and Rae v. T. Eaton Co. (Maritimes) Ltd. (1961), 
28 D.L. R. (2d) 522 (N.S.S.C.), at p. 534. 
Put another way, the inadequate warning might be viewed as the defect. See Burton 
v. L. 0. Smith Foundry Products C o . ,  529 F.2d 108 (1976);AIman Bros. Farms & Feed 
Mill Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 1295 (1971). 
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information provider was negligent in failing to warn of the risks 
associated with use of the product . I o 1  
The decision that information ought to have been disclosed by 
suppliers involves a number of variables all of which relate to the 
cost effectiveness of the warnings. They include the probability of 
the accident occurring, the nature and severity of the accident 
which does occur, the frequency with which the product is used in 
such a manner as to give rise to an injury, the costs of information 
transfer, knowledge of the risk by the supplier and user, and 
alternative sources of information. Finally, the nature of the risk 
of which warnings ought to have been given will be directly 
relevant to the establishment of the standard of care expected. 
The determination of negligence will depend to a large degree 
on the degree of risk presented by the foam. As the information 
transferred becomes less relevant to the consumer (as the proba- 
bility of injury decreases), it should not be transferred both 
because it may interfere with perception and utilization of high 
risk information, and because the marginal cost of information 
production and transfer may exceed the willingness of consumers 
to pay for it.lo2 The courts have adopted this limitation through 
the principle that the supplier need only disclose "foreseeable 
risks".lo3 
At the same time, there is a suggestion in some cases that 
suppliers must disclose information regarding any "dangerous" 
property in the product distributed, regardless of the degree of 
risk.lo4 This approach avoids the task of distinguishing, categori- 
cally, "high probability risks" which justify disclosure, from "low 
probability risks" which need not be disclosed. The decision in 
C. R. F. Holdings Ltd. v. Fundy Chemical International Ltd.'05 
lo' See Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Lid. v .  Imperial Chemical Industries Lid. (1972), 13 
K.I.R. 255; Rae and Rae v.  T.  Eaton Co. (Maritimes) Ltd., supra, footnote 100 at p. 
536. 
Io2The low probability risk may necessitate substantial acquisition costs which will 
exacerbate the misallocation of resources resulting from consumer under-utilization of 
the information. 
Io3 See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,  395 A. 2d 843 (1978) (unintended use of 
product where unforeseeable need not be warned against); Rae and Rae v.  T.  Eaton 
Co. (Maritimes) Ltd., supra, footnote 100 at p. 563 (no duty to warn of risks which are 
a mere possibility); Allard v. Manahan (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 614, [I9741 3 W.W.R. 
588 (B.C.S.C.); Tanner v. Atlantic Bridge Co. Lid. (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 162, 
[1965-6914 N.S.R. 441 (S.C.); Lem v. Barotto Sports Lid., supra, footnote 85. 
Io4 Wright V. Dunlop Rubber Co. Lid., supra, footnote 101 at p. 260 (manufacturers liable 
for failing to warn of risks in a product "containing some proportion, however low, of a 
known dangerous carcinogen"). 
105[1982]2W.W.R.385,19C.C.L.T.263(B.C.C.A.). 
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suggests that a seller of property may be required to disclose the 
presence of inherently dangerous or toxic substances notwith- 
standing the absence of evidence that the particular property 
posed a risk to health or safety when used for the buyer's 
purpose. The decisions, I think, are limited to the situation where 
the supplier knows of the risk,lo6 and thus avoids, to a degree, the 
imposition of substantial search costs necessary to discover low 
probability risks. Second, both cases in which this suggestion was 
made involved carcinogenic risks, and we might have a judicially 
crafted rule which imposes an absolute safety rule, and ignores 
the costs of prevention, in the limited situation where the risk of 
cancer is present.lo7 In C.R. F. Holdings, the court suggested that 
the issue as to the probability of the risk causing injury is a 
question to be determined by the market. The assumption, of 
course, is that if the risk is in fact a low probability risk, which 
most product users would not consider relevant, then the value of 
the property would not be adversely affected. Conversely, once it 
is determined that the risk exists, the court will not assess the 
"rationality" of the adverse market reaction to the knowledge, 
and the concomitant depreciation in the value of the property.lo8 
The adoption of an absolute duty to warn of risks no matter 
how low the probability of their occurrence, ignores both the cost 
of information acquisition and transfer, and the effect of "inform- 
ation overload" on consumer decision-making. As well, the 
1°6 Generally, the duty to warn is imposed in respect to risks of which the supplier knew or 
ought to have known. See, supra, footnote 85. See also, Crossman v. Stewart (1977), 5 
C.C.L.T. 45 (B.C.S.C.). But see Tuttahs v.  Maciak (1980), 6 Man. R. (2d) 52 (Q.B.), 
at p. 54 (private seller must know of risk). 
Io7 That is not to say that these decisions reflect a justifiable distinction. Legislative direc- 
tions to that end are not uncommon. See Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 
U.S.C., ss. 651 to 678, 655(b)(5); American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. 
Donovan, 101 S.Ct. 2478 (1981), at p. 2490. 
Io8 At the same time, there is a suggestion that the non-disclosure of the risk must be a 
"material" factor in inducing the user to purchase the property. See C.R.F. Holdings 
Ltd. v .  Fundy Chemical International Ltd., supra, footnote 105 at p. 391 W.W.R., p. 
271 C.C.L.T. per Craig J.A.; Hinchey v. Garda, [I9551 1 D.L.R. 840, [I9551 0. W.N. 
48 (H.C.J.); A. K. Turner, Estoppel by Representation, 3rd ed. (1977), at pp. 93, 97. 
This, of course, permits the court to assess whether the non-disclosure was objectively 
relevant in influencing the purchase decision, thus reintroducing an element of proba- 
bility into the assessment. 
The same analysis, imposing a duty on automobile manufacturers to warn consumers 
of any safety-related defect of which it is aware, regardless of  the degree of risk, has 
been imposed under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 26 (1st Supp.), as 
amended; R. v.  Ford Motor Co. of  Canada Ltd. (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 1 , s  M.V.R. 
237 (Ont. C.A.). 
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probability of injury is only one factor in determining whether a 
supplier ought to disclose a particular risk, and accordingly, 
should not be considered in an absolute fashion. It is too early to 
assess whether the C. R. F. Holdings analysis of market perception 
of risk will be adopted in a broader context. One hopes that it will 
be applied restrictively in light of the substantial inefficiencies 
which it generates. 
The view that the probability of the risk causing injury or 
damage is only one factor in determining whether an obligation to 
disclose information should be imposed is reinforced when one 
assesses the costs of information transfer in the case of manufac- 
turers of component chemicals. In most failure to warn cases, the 
assumption can be made that information transfer, which will 
often take place through package inserts or labelling, will not 
necessitate substantial costs. Conversely, the manufacturers of 
component chemicals may argue that it was not feasible to warn 
consumers directly, or alternatively, that the cost of the warnings 
would be substantial. To some degree that is true. None the less, 
an assessment must be made of the marginal costs of labelling the 
chemical container, of contractual terms and enforcement costs 
requiring applicators to warn homeowners, and perhaps of 
modification of the manufacturer's advertising and sales 
brochures to include warnings of the risk. 
Another possible element of the standard of care expected of 
the chemical manufacturers relates to the obligation to disclose 
risks associated with unintended uses of the product, or perhaps 
which arise when the product is "misused".109 The chemical 
manufacturers may argue that they are not responsible for failing 
to warn of risks associated with misapplication of the product. 
The better view, both doctrinallyH0 and in the light of accident 
lo9 Several cases make this point. See Austin v .  3M Canada Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 
656 at p. 661, 7 O.R. (2d) 200 at p. 205 (Co. Ct.) (no duty to warn where product not 
dangerous in ordinary use); Schulz v .  Leeside Developments Ltd. (1978), 90 D.L.R. 
(3d) 98 at p. 108,6 C.C.L.T. 248 at p. 260 (B.C.C.A.) (no duty to warn in the case of 
the use of a product other than the use for which it was designed); Ivan v. Aoco Ltd. 
(1980), 5 Sask. R. 78 (C.A.). In some cases the issue is dealt with as one of causation 
rather than the standard of care expected of the supplier. See Vancouver-Fraser Park 
District v .  Olmstead (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 416, [I9751 2 S.C.R. 831. 
11° Crossman v .  Stewart (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 677 at pp. 683, 686, 5 C.C.L.T. 45 at pp. 
53, 57 (B.C.S.C.) (failure to warn of risks of improper, unintended manner of use); 
Ruch v .  Colonial Coach Lines Ltd. (1965), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 491 at p. 498, [I9661 1 O.R. 
621 at p. 628 (C.A), affd 1 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [I9691 S.C.R. 106 (unintended use risks must 
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reduction concerns, is to insist on warning of risks associated with 
use of the product, whether or not the use was "intended" or 
"designed". The only limitation, of course, is to limit the duty to 
warn to risks of sufficient magnitude that the costs of the warning 
and concerns with information overload are taken into account. 
Thus the courts limit the warnings to risks, whether in intended or 
unintended uses, which are "foreseeable", or "usual" or objec- 
tively anticipated.lll The inquiry in the formaldehyde case must 
then be directed to industry knowledge of the risks of poor 
quality application, and thus the foreseeability and probability of 
"unintended" applications. 
(3) Contractual Liability 
The third legal issue in the formaldehyde case considered from 
a private law perspective is the contractual liability of the 
installers of the foam insulation. It is generally conceded that 
installers who entered into contracts to supply and install formal- 
dehyde insulation are unlikely to have the financial resources to 
justify litigation which seeks to obtain compensation for large 
numbers of the public. None the less, this class of potential 
defendants is quite large, and in some cases, the installation may 
have been subcontracted by financially viable corporate defend- 
ants, to smaller enterprises. For the purposes of this paper I will 
assume that the contractual documents, if any, describe the entire 
legally relevant contractual relations between the parties.l12 In 
be disclosed if "objectively anticipated"); Labrecque v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
(1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d) 289, [I9771 6 W. W.R. 122 (Sask. Q.B.), vard 110 D.L.R. (3d) 
686, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 558 (Sask. C.A.) (manufacturer liable for failure to warn of risks 
associated with unintended manner of use); Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. v. B.D.H.  
Chemicals, Ltd., [I9691 3 All E.R. 1681 (Q.B.) (implied term to warn of hazards 
associated with foreseeable, albeit unintended use); Lem v. Barotto Sports Ltd. (1976), 
69 D.L.R. (3d) 276,l  A.R. 556 (S.C. App. Div.). 
] I 1  It is not clear, at least to me, which standard is most likely to be chosen by a court 
which looks at this issue closely. 
' I 2  It is true, of course, that the actual express terms of the installation contract may 
include salesmen's representations, representations contained in advertising 
brochures, the particular terms of standard form contracts, and a range of specific 
terms. See, e.g . ,  Consumer Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 65, s. 3(2); Murray v. 
Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 23 O.R. (2d) 456 (H.C.J.); Leitz v. 
Saskatoon Drug and Stationery Co. Ltd.; T.  C. Distributors (1970) Ltd., Third Parry 
(1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 106,4 Sask. R. 35 (Q.B.). 
It may also be possible to argue that the consumer entered into a collateral contract 
with the suppliers of advertising materials upon which the homeowner relied in 
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most cases, the contract documents will simply describe the 
insulation and the price. Accordingly, the supplier's contractual 
obligation will be defined by implied terms under provincial sales 
legislation,l13 at common law,l14 or perhaps under recently 
enacted consumer products warranty legislation.115 Of course, the 
common law implied terms can, in theory, be modified consensu- 
ally, while in most provinces the legislative terms are not subject 
to a contrary agreement.l16 To that extent, whether the instal- 
lation and supply contract is considered to be a sales contract may 
still be relevant. 
Apart from specific implied terms related to the service 
element of the installation contract, the legal right to compen- 
sation will depend upon the content of the implied conditions of 
merchantability and fitness for purpose. The UFFI case, it seems 
to me, does not permit a simple application of the implied terms. 
purchasing formaldehyde insulation. See Carlill v.  The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co . ,  
[I8921 2 Q.B. 484; Roberts v.  Montex Development Corp. (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 660, 
[I9791 4 W. W.R. 306 (B.C.S.C.); Naken v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1979), 92 
D.L.R. (3d) 100, 21 O.R. (2d) 780 (C.A.), revd 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385,32 C.P.C. 138 
(S.C.C.). 
113 The implied terms of merchantability and fitness for purpose will be applicable to the 
contract to supply insulation if it is considered to be a sale of goods. See Sale of Goods 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s. 18; R.S.O. 1980, c. 462, s. 15; R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-1, s. 
15; R.S.A. 1980, c. S-2, s. 17; R.S.M. 1970, c. S10, s. 16; R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, s. 16; 
R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 341, s. 16. 
I l 4  It does not seem to be relevant that the contract may be considered to be a contract for 
the supply of labour and materials rather than a sale of goods. Terms analogous to 
those implied under sales legislation will be implied at common law under the same 
conditions. See G. H. Myers & Co. v. Brent Cross Service C o . ,  [I9341 1 K.B. 46; A.-G.  
Can. v. Laminated Structures and Holdings Ltd. (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 92 (N.S.S.C. in 
Banco), affd 32 D.L.R. (2d) 146, [I9621 S.C.R. 160; Young and Marten, Ltd. v .  
McManus Childs, Ltd. ,  [I9681 2 All E.R. 1169 (H.L.). 
"5See the Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 11.4, 5. The 
definition of "acceptable quality" in s. 2(a) of the Act does not seem to differ signifi- 
cantly from the common law definition of merchantable quality. See L. J. Romero, 
"The Consumer Products Warranties Act", 43 Sask. L. Rev. 81 (1979), at p. 172; 
Romero, "The Saskatchewan Consumer Product Warranties Act and Related Issues" 
in J.  S. Ziegel, ed., Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Commercial and 
Consumer Law (1979), p. 32. 
The New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. 
C-18.1 apparently re-enacts the sales implied terms. See ss. 10(l)(a), 11. 
I l 6  See e.g. ,  R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s. 20; See generally, Romero, supra, footnote 115 at 
pp. 95-7,130 Sask. L. Rev.; Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at pp. 175-87. 
At the same time, it is obvious that the standard imported through the implied 
warranties will be subject to infinite variation as the seller retains the ability to modify 
the description and price of the goods. The concept of "merchantability" is 
meaningless except in relation to  those considerations. 
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As explained earlier, the vast majority of homeowners will not be 
able to demonstrate either personal injury or property damage 
associated with foam insulation. The only breach of contract may 
be the devaluation of the product and home related to a 
perceived risk of personal injury or property damage. Secondly, 
those homeowners or members of their families who have 
suffered injury to their health, may be members of a sub-class of 
the general population which reacts in an "idiosyncratic" manner 
to formaldehyde off-gassed products. 
The concept of merchantable quality as defined in sales legis- 
lation in Canada has been articulated by the courts on the basis of 
two related but distinct tests. The first is that the product will be 
of merchantable quality if and only if "some buyers acting 
reasonably and fully informed of the actual condition and the 
quality of the product would buy the product as described, 
without a substantial abatement of the purchase price."l17 The 
second formulation of the concept is that the product must be fit 
for use for at least one of the purposes for which the product as 
described and sold at the price for which it was sold is normally 
used.lI8 Once the standard is established the seller is responsible 
to the buyer whether or not the seller knew or could have known 
of the defect in the product sold.Il9 It should be obvious that the 
tests are conceptually indistinguishable from one another. If 
some buyers, fully informed of the defects in, and the quality of, 
the goods would buy them under the contract description without 
a substantial abatement of the price, it necessarily follows that the 
goods are reasonably fit for at least one purpose which these 
goods as described would commonly be used. Conversely, if the 
goods are fit for at least one purpose which goods of that 
description are normally used, then it necessarily follows that 
some buyers fully informed of the defect and quality of the 
product would buy it as described without a substantial 
abatement of the purchase price. 
Where there is evidence that the formaldehyde insulation has 
I l 7  See B. S. Brown & Son Ltd. v. Craiks Ltd., [I9701 1 All. E.R. 823 (H.L.). See also 
Henry Kendall & Sons v.  William Lillico & Sons Ltd., [I9691 2 A.C. 31 (H.L.), at p. 
75; Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. v. Grant (1933), 50 C.L.R. 387 at p. 418. 
See Carnmell Laird & Co. v. Manganese Bronze and Brass Ltd., [I9341 A.C. 402 at p. 
430; Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd., supra, footnote 1 1  7 at pp. 
77,97,108,118; Davids Pty. Ltd. v. George Wills & Co. Ltd., 119571 1 L1.L. Rep. 203. 
"9 See Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., [I9781 Q . B .  791 at p. 800. 
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deteriorated to the extent that it no longer insulates, gives off 
formaldehyde gas or other gaseous product which has caused 
physical injury to the inhabitants of the home, or has caused 
property damage to the home of the buyer, there will be little 
difficulty in demonstrating a breach of the implied condition of 
merchantability under sales legislation, or of the analogous 
implied term at common law in the case of service contracts, 
under either of the tests described above. The difficult case will 
arise where, as is common, it is not possible to prove that the 
foam insulation has degraded to a significant degree or has caused 
physical injury, and there is no evidence of property damage 
associated with installation of the foam. In that case the plaintiff 
must argue that the product is not merchantable on the ground 
that, while the specific insulation in his house is fully adequate for 
its purpose and is not defective in any demonstrable fashion, no 
other buyers will buy the house without a substantial reduction in 
its purchase price. The particular insulation is not defective; 
rather the reputation of the product is such that he has suffered 
direct and consequential economic loss as a result. 
On first impression, it appears possible to argue that the 
product is unmerchantable. In other words, one could say that in 
light of the reputation of the product in the market-place no 
buyers fully informed of that fact would have bought the foam or 
would buy the foam without a substantial abatement of the 
purchase price. The cases, however, reveal that in all cases where 
the product has been found unmerchantable, there has been a 
defect in the specific product at issue.120 In other words, the 
particular subject-matter of the contract has fallen below the 
standard which the buyer could reasonably expect it to have. In 
the fact situation just described, the particular product is, at least 
in a functional sense, perfect. 
There are, however, several cases involving transactions where 
the buyer has not been able to resell a product, not because of 
any inherent defect in its quality, condition, or functional charac- 
teristics, but because of legislation which prohibits the resale,121 
120The "defect" is often assumed where the product has caused physical injury or 
property damage, or is not functioning adequately. At the same time, the requirement 
of a product "defect" is sometimes acknowledged in express terms. See the Consumer 
Products Warranties Act, supra, footnote 115, s.  11.4. See also Australian Knitting 
Mills Lid. v. Grant, supra, footnote 117 where Dixon J .  refers to the "hidden defects" 
of which a buyer is taken to know, when deciding to purchase goods. 
'21 See Sumner, Permain & Co. v. Webb & C o . ,  [I9221 1 K . B .  55 (C.A.); Phoenix Distrib- 
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or because of a right in a third party to enjoin the sub-sale.I22 A 
realistic assessment of these cases looks to the nature of the risk 
assumed by the seller. In .  the absence of specific information 
relating to the buyer's intended sub-sale, its location, and perhaps 
the laws of that jurisdiction, it seems highly unlikely that the 
buyer could reasonably expect his seller to have assumed the risk 
that the goods will comply with the variety of, and constantly 
changing regulations in force in a multitude of national, state, and 
municipal jurisdictions. Where, however, the buyer and seller are 
in the same jurisdiction, or perhaps, in interprovincial trade 
where the applicable regulatory framework is uniform across the 
country, the courts have held that the seller impliedly assumed 
the risk of compliance with legislation permitting use or r e ~ a 1 e . I ~ ~  
It seems, as I have suggested, that in many formaldehyde cases 
the only demonstrable loss is represented by the reduced 
economic value of the residential home, or the cost of foam 
removal and restoration. The argument must be made that the 
loss in market value of the home, and the unsaleability of the 
product, constitute a breach of the implied condition of 
merchantability on the ground that: 
(a) the defect in the product consists of an unreasonable risk 
of physical injury, associated with the particular good sold 
to the plaintiff, notwithstanding that neither the defect 
nor the injury is yet apparent;-or 
( b )  the defect in the product consists of a depreciation in 
market value associated with public reaction to an alleged 
design defect in the product. 
The conceptualization of the defect as consisting of an unrea- 
sonable risk of physical injury (or perhaps property damage) is 
utors Ltd. v.  L.B. Clarke (London) Ltd., [I9661 2 L1.L. Rep. 285, affd [I9671 1 L1.L. 
Rep. 518. 
I z 2  See Niblen Ltd. v .  Confectioners' Materials Co. Ltd., [I9211 3 K.B. 387 (C.A.). 
I z 3  See e.g . ,  J .  Barry Winsor & Assoc. Ltd. v. Belgo Canadian Manufacturing Co .  Lrd. 
(1976), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 685, 32 C.P.R. (2d) 142 (B.C.C.A.), where lamps which 
contravened the Electrical Energy Inspection Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 126, now 
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 104, resulted in a breach of s. 18(a) of the Sale of Goods Act. The 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that a supplier of a lighting system which did not 
comply with the Electrical Installation and Inspection Act was in breach of an implied 
condition that the work and materials would be reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
they were required. Laliberte v. Blanchard (1980), 31 N.B.R. (2d) 275 (N.B.C.A.). 
See also Wood v. Cuvelier (1979), 34 N.S.R. (2d) 261 (S.C.T.D.), at pp. 267-8 (non- 
compliance with National Building Code). 
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appealing for several reasons. First, it recognizes that although 
contractual analysis assumes a bipartite relationship, the loss is 
associated with an alleged design defect on the part of the 
manufacturer. If one conceptualizes the design defect as the 
design of a product which is unreasonably dangerous, then 
recovery by a consumer against his immediate seller will depend 
upon proof that the product is defective in this sense.124 If this is 
so, then, notwithstanding the possibility that the consumer may 
not be able to recover this economic loss from the manufacturer, 
it is not unlikely that the seller will be able to shift the loss to the 
manufacturer, under the wholesale supply contract. 
Second, it may be undesirable, if one assumes that consumers 
are not indifferent between physical injury and post-injury 
compensation, to require that an individual suffer actual injury or 
property damage before being able to rely on the implied 
condition of merchantability in the case of a defectively designed 
product. The function of permitting recovery in this case is to 
permit the necessary repair work to be performed in order to 
avoid personal injury. Recovery for this economic loss in the 
absence of a demonstrable defect in the particular product sold 
will thus have to be premised on a subsidiary argument that the 
breach of the implied condition of merchantability has occurred, 
and the resulting economic loss is compensable only where the 
plaintiff is exposed to a present or imminent risk to health or 
safety. 
Third, it removes the risk that a seller will be liable to 
compensate buyers for a fall in market value which results not 
from a perceived risk of personal injury (and thus a loss related to 
a matter within the scope of the manufacturer's responsibility as a 
design defect), but from the impact of extrinsic market forces 
which may range from an increase in the availability of substitute 
goods, to increased competition in the relevant industry, to 
information about the potential resale value of the product, to the 
enactment of legislation or administrative regulations prohibiting 
resale. In other words, the requirement that recovery for 
economic loss be limited to cases where there is an imminent risk 
of personal injury or property damage, demands proof of a 
relationship between the economic loss and the quality of the 
lz4 Implied warranty protection has been extended to design defects in some jurisdictions. 
See Vandercook & Son Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F.2d 104 (1968). 
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product itself, whether by reason of a design defect or a manufac- 
turing defect. 
Whether or not a court will determine, in the case under discus- 
sion, that the loss in market value of the homes is due to an 
imminent or present risk to the safety of the occupants so as to 
render the product unmerchantable is difficult to predict. The 
existence of the ban under the Hazardous Products may be 
used to support this view. In addition, the court may accept 
evidence of appraisers as to the reduction in market value, and as 
to the perceptions of health risks of participants in the market- 
place upon which their actions are based. As well, it is obvious 
that expert medical testimony as to the nature and degree of the 
risks to health and safety presented by the product will be directly 
relevant to this inquiry. 
This last point deserves further inquiry. The assumption I have 
made so far is that a plaintiff will be able to demonstrate that the 
particular product in his house poses a risk to his health.lZ6 It is, 
however, open to debate whether all insulation poses a risk to 
health or safety, and that the risk is simply one of degree; or 
whether only a small percentage of the homes, in fact, poses an 
unreasonable risk. In both cases, the multi-variable nature of the 
risk,127 and existing technology128 may not permit us to distinguish 
125 R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3, as amended. This reasoning was adopted by Anderson J.A. of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in C. R. F. Holdings Ltd. v.  Fundy Chemical Interna- 
tional Ltd. (1980), 21 B.C.L.R. 345, 14 C.C.L.T. 87 (S.C.), new trial ordered 33 
B.C.L.R.291 atp.323,19C.C.L.T.263atp.309. 
126The analysis of the contractual action assumes that the injury, to be relevant, must be 
incurred by the contracting party, and thus the only relevant risk of injury is that faced 
by the person who purchased the UFFI product. It is open to debate whether the risk of 
injury to which non-contracting parties may be exposed can be relied upon in the 
breach of contract action. 
'2' The risk of off-gassing will vary with the temperature of the wall cavity, degradation of 
the component chemicals prior to installation, contaminants in the component chemi- 
cals, mixing ratio, drying rate of the foam, absolute humidity content of the air, 
reaction with other building materials, air flow through interior walls, air flow through 
exterior walls, application of the foam in locations which expose the foam to heat, 
degree of exposure to wind, and component chemicals which contain hydrophilic 
materials. See C. Shirtliffe, Report, Exhibit 22, Hazardous Products Board of Review, 
Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, at pp. 6-14. These factors suggest that all houses 
will pose some degree of risk; that is, we may not be able to state categorically that 
certain houses are "safe" in that they do not pose a risk to health which is significantly 
greater than that of non-foam insulation homes. 
'28 The testing systems described in the leading technical reports all suffer from the multi- 
variable nature of the product risk. Thus gas readings will vary considerably from 
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between safer and less safe homes, or between safe and 
dangerous homes. If there is a scientific basis for the position that 
some homes are safe, on a qualitatively distinct basis, while only a 
small percentage are "dangerous", we face the intractable 
problem of permitting compensation to all homeowners notwith- 
standing that the vast majority do not, in fact, possess a product 
which exposes them to a risk of personal injury. Alternatively, if 
the question of dangerousness is a question of degree, depending 
upon a range of interdependent variables, an award of compen- 
sation which does not vary directly with the risk, and in fact will 
often relate to the perceived "high risk" product, clearly results 
in a mis-allocation of resources, and possible over-compensation. 
This analysis brings us to the second possible formulation of 
unmerchantability - that the "~nsaleability'~ of the product (and 
the home) is itself a defect which permits the court to impose 
contractual liability. In either of the "risk analysis" scenarios 
discussed above, the supplier can argue that he has supplied a 
product that functions adequately, and has not caused physical 
injury or property damage to the contracting party. The only loss 
suffered by the plaintiff is represented by the unsaleability of the 
product. The question then becomes, to what extent has the seller 
assumed the risk of the market reputation of his product, related 
perhaps to inadequate installation or defective components 
installed by other commercial enterprises? 
There is little doubt that "saleability" is a central concept in 
considering mer~hantabi1ity.l~~ None the less, the issue is actually 
one of risk allocation, and it is difficult to support the view that a 
commercial enterprise can be taken to have assumed the risk that 
the "perfect" product which it supplies will retain its market 
value in the face of actual or potential breaches of contract and 
design negligence over which it has little or no effective control, 
and in respect of which it may not be able to obtain insurance. I 
am not aware of any cases which have recognized market loss in 
and of itself as a breach of the implied condition of merchanta- 
bility. The concept is, of course, a traditional tool in the 
assessment of damages once it is determined that a breach of 
season to season, day to day, among rooms in the house, among stud spaces, and over 
time. See Shirtliffe, supra, footnote 127 at p. 7; Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
supra, footnote 6 at 14381-14387. 
129 Henry Kendull& Sons v.  William Lillico & Sons Ltd., supra, footnote 117 at p. 75. 
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contract has occurred - the loss in market value may be used to 
assess, in an objective fashion, the injury to the plaintiff. As well, 
the courts, on rare occasions, have acknowledged that depreci- 
ation in property value, caused by public prejudice or appre- 
hension about a particular condition, even if the condition has not 
manifested itself, may be the subject of a damage award in 
nuisance cases,130 and recently in an action in deceit.131 
In all these cases, however, the action was based in nuisance, 
negligence or deceit, rather than contract. Thus while the cases 
recognize that the courts may be unwilling to assess the ration- 
ality of market behaviour in measuring damages, they clearly do 
not establish that depreciation in market value in and of itself is a 
breach of an implied contractual term. In C. R. F. Holdings Ltd. v. 
Fundy Chemical International Ltd. 13* damages were awarded for 
depreciation in market value arising from public apprehension 
over the presence of radioactive landfill. Although evidence was 
led that the radiation emitted was within "acceptable" standards 
and statistically posed "no" health risks, the court held that the 
loss of value due to public reluctance to be exposed to radiation, 
no matter how low the risk, was a loss for which the plaintiffs 
were entitled to be compensated in damages. The only concern of 
the court was that the perception was entertained by "reason- 
able" people and whether a potential buyer of the property would 
be influenced by that fact in deciding how much he would be 
willing to pay for the land. 
130See Everett v.  Paschall, 111 P. 879 (1910) (injunction granted against sanitarium 
construction which, while it posed no "real danger", caused the public to perceive the 
existence of danger and thereby decreased the resale value of the plaintiffs land). See 
also Ferry v. Seattle, 200 P. 336 (1921); Cunningham v.  Town of Tieton, 374 P.2d 375 
(1963). But see Shuttleworth v. Vancouver General Hospital, [I9271 2 D.L.R. 573, 
119271 1 W.W.R. 476 (B.C.S.C.) (mere sentiment of danger cannot support a claim in 
damages without concomitant tangible injury); Clerk v.  Sunset Hills, 273 P.2d 645 
(1954); O'Laughlin v.  City of Fort Gibson, 389 P.2d 506 (1964); Thomas Christopher 
Cowper Essex v.  The Local Board for the District of Acton in the County of Middlesex 
(1889), 14 A.C. 153 (H.L.); Veitch v.  Mount Pearl (No. 2)  (1980), 25 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 
307 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) (no recovery until perceived risk manifests itself). 
Recovery will not, however, be allowed where the economic loss is not proved, or is 
transitional. See Bun v. City of Oshawa, 119261 4 D.L.R. 1138,59 O.L.R. 520 (C.A.); 
Wigle v.  Township of Gosfield South (1912), 2 D.L.R. 619 (Ont. C.A.); Godfrey v.  
Good Rich Refining Co. Ltd., [I9401 2 D.L.R. 164, [I9401 O.R. 190 (C.A.); Culp and 
Hart v.  Township of East York & Metropolitan Toronto (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 417, 
[1956]O.R. 983(H.C.),affd9D.L.R. (2d)749(Ont. C.A.). 
131 See C.R. F. Holdings Ltd. v.  Fundy Chemical International Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 125 at 
p.320B.C.L.R.,p.304C.C.L.T. 
132 Supra, footnote 125. 
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In conclusion, it is reasonably clear, where a plaintiff can 
demonstrate physical injury or property damage caused by the 
installation or presence of urea formaldehyde foam insulation, 
that an action for breach of the implied condition of 
merchantable quality against the installer will have a strong 
probability of success. Where, however, a plaintiff has not 
suffered actual physical injury or property damage, or as is more 
likely, is unable to demonstrate the necessary causal relationship 
between the injury and the insulation, recovery for the "cost of 
repair" or diminution in market value will pose considerable 
problems. 
In addition to the implied condition of merchantable quality, a 
seller impliedly promises that the subject matter of the contract 
will be "reasonably fit for the particular purpose which is made 
known to him by the buyer." For the purposes of this discussion I 
will assume that the section is applicable to the transaction. Three 
issues present themselves for consideration in an analysis of the 
concept of fitness for purpose. First, if the alleged breach of the 
implied condition consists of product shrinkage and inadequate 
insulating properties, to what extent must the product have 
deteriorated before a breach will be found? Second, can the 
alleged breach of the implied condition consist of actual personal 
injury or product damage? Third, can a purchaser who is unable 
to resell his house, but cannot demonstrate inadequate perfor- 
mance, personal injury, or property damage, recover compen- 
sation for an alleged breach of the condition? 
The courts have held that where a product has only one 
particular purpose, in this case as home insulation, the product 
must be "reasonably fit" for that purpose. What is meant by 
reasonable fitness depends upon the circumstances of the 
particular contract, but the nature of the implied promise appears 
to be that the seller undertakes to supply a product which will 
perform adequately - this aspect of fitness for purpose focuses 
on function. As Lord Reid said in Kendall v .  Lillico, "the seller 
must supply goods reasonably fit to enable the buyer to carry out 
his purpose in any normal way",133 and inadequate performance 
has been the foundation for recovery for breach in a number of 
cases.134 At the same time, it is well recognized that the product 
133 [I9691 2A.C. 31 (H.L.), at p. 80. 
134 See, e .g . ,  Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113,23 O.R. (2d) 456; 
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need not be perfectly fit; rather, as the section itself informs us, 
the product need only be reasonably fit. Thus in Bartlett v. Sidney 
Marcus Motors,135 a case involving a malfunctioning automobile, 
the court suggested that a used car which was far from perfect and 
required a great deal of work did not result in a breach of the 
implied condition of fitness, since in light of the description and 
price of the good, it was "reasonably fit" for the purpose of being 
driven along the road.136 A recent decision in Labrecque v. 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and Eli Lilly Co. Ltd.I3' illustrates the 
difficulties presented in determining reasonable fitness for 
purpose in the context of defective performance. In that case the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that a herbicide was not unfit 
even though a herbicide-treated crop yielded considerably less 
flax than an untreated crop. The point is that when one examines 
adequacy of performance in the case of formaldehyde insulation 
one must assess whether, in the particular case, the insulation has 
deteriorated to a sufficient degree to render the product unfit. It 
would serve no purpose to attempt to define, on a percentage 
basis, what the critical degree of shrinkage (either in linear or 
volumetric terms), or failure in insulating properties, might be. 
There are two additional points which must be made. The first 
is that in the context of fitness for purpose it is not necessary to 
demonstrate a product specific "defect" in the goods sold. The 
focus of the analysis is on function, and if the product fails to 
perform reasonably well, the seller has breached the implied 
~ 0 n d i t i o n . I ~ ~  The second point is that a plaintiff who can only 
demonstrate inadequate performance may face difficulty in 
obtaining damages for certain kinds of losses including personal 
injury claims, property damage and economic loss. Applying 
Mack v.  Struike (1963), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 763, 45 W.W.R. 605 (Sask. Q.B.). The test 
used in Cammel Laird & Co. Ltd. v.  The Manganese Bronze & Brass Co. ,  Ltd., [I9341 
A.C. 402 (H.L.), and adopted in Cehave N. V. v.  Bremer Handelsgesellschafr m.6.  H . ,  
[I9751 3 All E.R. 739 (C.A.) is essentially that the product will meet the implied 
condition if it reasonably performs its intended function. 
135 [I9651 1 W.L.R. 1013. This reasoning was expressly adopted in Peters v. Parkway 
Mercury Sales Ltd. (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 128,lO N.B.R. (2d) 703 (S.C. App. Div.). 
136 See Kendall v.  Lillico, supra, footnote 133 at p. 115per Lord Pearce. 
(1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 686, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 558 (Sask. C.A.), affd in part 78 D.L.R. 
(3d) 289, [I9771 6 W.W.R. 122 (Sask. Q.B.). 
138 See Bristol Tramways v.  Fiat Motors Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 831 (C.A.). Similarly, the 
House of Lords in Council of the Shire of Ashford v .  Dependable Motors Pty. Ltd., 
[I9611 A.C. 336 held that tractors were unfit when they could not perform construction 
work. 
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traditional rules of remoteness in contract law, the plaintiff will 
have to demonstrate that these kinds of losses (albeit not their 
extent)139 were reasonably within the contemplation of the 
defendant as "liable" to result from the breach of contract, or 
perhaps as a "not unlikely" consequence of the breach.I4O If the 
breach consists of the inadequate insulating properties of the 
foam, this remoteness limitation may pose an additional hurdle to 
recovery for contractual risks other than increased heating costs. 
The concept of reasonable fitness has also been applied where 
the product sold has caused physical damage, and where the 
defective good is unsafe.141 In all of these cases, however, the 
specific product sold was defective and actual physical injury or 
property damage 0 ~ c u r r e d . l ~ ~  It is clear, however, that the 
implied condition of fitness for purpose does not require that the 
product be perfectly safe or perform in a perfect fashion for all 
purposes. In this respect, the case law indicates that the court will 
take into account the severity and nature of the injury suffered by 
the plaintiff, and the probability of the injury occurring, in deter- 
mining whether the implied condition has been met.143 
The final point which may be made in considering the implied 
condition of reasonable fitness for purpose as related to safety 
and property damage, is that in several cases the courts have 
suggested that a product is not reasonably fit for its intended 
purpose unless the risks presented by the product in ordinary or 
normal use are properly disclosed either through labels or 
adequate warnings. 144 Again, however, these cases involved 
'39 See Wroth v.  Tyler, [I9731 1 All E.R. 897 (Ch); Asamera Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Sea Oil & 
General Corp. (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [I9791 1 S.C.R. 633. 
140 Hadley v.  Barendale (1854), 9 Ex. 341, 156 E.R. 145; Victoria Lauridry Ltd. v. 
Newman Industries Ltd., Coulson & Co. Ltd., Third Party, [I9491 1 All E.R. 997 
(C.A.); Koufos v.  C .  Czarnikow Ltd.,  [I9691 1 A.C. 350 (H.L.). 
I4l For example Yelland v. National Cafe, [I9551 5 D.L.R. 560, 16 W.W.R. 529 (Sask. 
C.A.) (unsound pop bottle exploded, injuring purchaser); Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v.  
Christopher Hill Ltd., 119721 A.C. 441, [I9711 1 All E.R. 847 (H.L.) (animal foodstuffs 
toxic to mink); Buckley v.  Lever Brothers Ltd., [I9531 4 D.L.R. 16, [I9531 O.R. 704 
(H.C.) (plaintiffs eye injured by clothespin breaking); Curtis v.  Rideout (1980), 27 
Nfld. &P.E.I.R. 392(Nfld. S.C.T.D.),at p.408. 
'42 Connop v.  Canadian Car Division Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd.; Witco Chemicals 
Ltd., Third Party (1978), 98 D.L.R. 747, 24 O.R. (2d) 593 (C. A.); Farmer v.  Canada 
Packers Ltd. (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 63, [I9561 O.R. 657 (H.C.); Willis v. FMC 
Machinery and Chemicals Ltd. (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 127, 11 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 361 
(P.E.I.S.C.). 
143 Kendall (Henry) & Sons v. Lillico & Sons, Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 136 at p. 166. 
Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. v. B.D.H. Chemicals Ltd. ,  [I9691 3 All E.R. 1681 
Heinonline - -  8  Can. Bus. L.J. 3 4 7  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4  
348 Canadian Business Law Journal pol. 8 
actual physical injury or property damage suffered by the plain- 
tiff. 
Where it cannot be demonstrated that the product has caused 
physical injury or property damage, and where the product does 
in fact insulate the buyer's residence, it would be difficult to argue 
that the product is not reasonably fit for its intended purpose 
simply on the grounds that no other buyer would buy the home 
without a significant reduction in its market value. The point here 
is identical to that described above in the discussion of merchant- 
ability. It is unlikely that the seller will be found in breach of an 
implied obligation that the goods be reasonably fit for their 
intended purpose simply by virtue of the depreciation of the 
market value of the home in which the product is installed. 
Analogous to the "non-defective" goods cases discussed above 
in relation to the concept of merchantable quality are cases in 
which the goods, although effective in performing the function 
for which they were intended, caused property damage when they 
interacted with other products. Thus, in Vacwell Engineering Co. 
Ltd. v. B. D. H. Chemicals Ltd. a seller was held liable for 
breach of the implied condition of fitness for purpose when a 
chemical did not carry a warning of explosion hazards - in that 
case an explosion occurred upon the chemical's contact with 
water. Another case, similar to Vacwell, is Willis v. FMC 
Machinery & Chemicals Ltd.14(j where a herbicide, though 
effective for its purpose, was held not reasonably fit where it was 
discovered to be unsafe when used with certain insecticides. 
Again, these cases involved actual physical damage to the goods 
sold or to other property. There is, however, at least one case 
which recognized a homeowner's fear of injury as a factor in 
determining that the product was not reasonably fit for its 
intended purpose.147 Even in this case, however, the mobile home 
purchased was held unfit due inpart to the owner's fear of the risk 
of electrical fires, and in part because of manufacturing defects 
which interfered with the plaintiffs use of the mobile home. 
(Q.B.) ,  vard [I9711 1 Q .B .  111 (C.A.); Willis v. FMC Machinery and Chemicals Ltd., 
supra, footnote 142; but see Lem v. Barotto Sports Ltd. (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 276 at 
p. 290, 1 A.R. 556 at p. 577 (S.C. App. Div.). A similar analysis has been applied to 
the concept of merchantability by Pearce L.J. in Kendall v. Lillico, supra, footnote 136 
at p. 119. 
145 Supra, footnote 144. 
i46 Supra, footnote 142. 
14' Doucette and Doucette v. Commodore Mobile Homes Ltd. (1976), 22 N.S.R. (2d) 598 
(S.C.T.D.), at p. 607. 
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In conclusion, an analysis of the implied condition of fitness for 
purpose in sales legislation as it applies to urea formaldehyde 
foam insulation is quite similar to the analysis of the implied 
condition of merchantability. Where a particular homeowner is 
able to demonstrate a causal link between property damage or 
personal injury and the existence of foam insulation, or where the 
insulation is not performing its insulating function, recovery 
under the implied condition, assuming it is applicable on the 
facts, will be relatively straightforward. Where, however, those 
facts do not exist, or cannot be proved, recovery for economic 
loss associated only with market reputation presents the same 
conceptual and policy considerations discussed at length in the 
preceding discussion of merchantability. To allow recovery is to 
hold that sellers impliedly assume the risk that changes in the 
reputation of the product, and its market value, will not result in 
economic loss to a buyer. In the absence of a causal link between 
the loss in reputation and market value and a demonstrable risk 
of personal injury or property damage in a specific case, I 
perceive substantial hurdles in persuading a court that this should 
be so. 
Even where physical injury has been suffered, and a causal 
connection demonstrated, the suppliers may argue that the injury 
is an idiosyncratic reaction to the product. The injuries suffered 
by homeowners, assuming for the purposes of argument that they 
can be proved to be causally related to the foam insulation, may 
take several forms. Medical evidence148 suggests that individuals 
exposed to a formaldehyde insulation environment may experi- 
ence: 
(a) temporary irritation of eyes, nasal cavities, and coughing, 
nasal congestion and similar acute irritant effects; 
(b)  chronic irritant effects including breathing difficulties, 
persistent coughs, chest congestion and asthma; 
( c )  allergic reactions to formaldehyde gas; and 
(d) specific chemical sensitization to formaldehyde and 
. general non-specific chemical sensitization. 
It might be argued that these symptoms are suffered by an "id- 
iosyncratic" sub-category of homeowners and accordingly, that 
148 See supra, footnote 12. 
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the implied conditions of sales legislation do not apply. The tradi- 
tional analysis suggests that a product which causes injury to a 
"non-appreciable" subclass of buyers will still be of merchantable 
quality. 149 Similarly, where the buyer's reaction can be considered 
"abnormal", then the seller can argue that he has supplied a 
product which is reasonably fit for "normal" purposes, and thus 
has not breached the implied condition of fitness for purpose.150 
The formaldehyde homeowner, at least for the purposes of this 
discussion, can be taken to be ignorant of his peculiar sensitivity 
to the formaldehyde foam environment; thus we need not be 
concerned with the questions of risk assumption, contributory 
negligence, or particular sub- purpose^.^^^ 
The argument that the seller of consumer products should not 
be responsible for low probability risks, whether or not it has 
merit, would not seem to be appropriate in the UFFI case. First, 
there is the accepted scientific argument to the effect that there is 
no demonstrated level of formaldehyde exposure which is inher- 
ently safe,Is2 or put another way, "there is no population 
threshold for the irritant effects of formaldehyde".lS3 It seems 
that all individuals will experience some irritant effects of formal- 
dehyde if the duration of exposure and gas concentrations are 
sufficiently severe. At the same time, a significant percentage of 
the population, estimated at 10-12%, may have hyper-reactive 
airways,lS4 which may result in a low threshold at which irritation 
would be experienced, and which may exacerbate the severity of 
the adverse reaction. The percentage of the population which 
might experience chronic irritant, allergenic and chemical suscep- 
tibility effects does not appear to have been demonstrated 
conclusively.155 In light of the "general toxicity" of formaldehyde 
149 This concept is most obvious in the American cases. Howard v .  Avon Prod. Inc., 395 
P.2d 1007 (1964); Ern v.  Revlon, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261 (1970). The standard has, it 
seems, been relaxed in recent cases. See M.G. Dixon, Drug Product Liability (1981), 
Chapter 9.05 at 9-30 - 9-34. See also, L. R. Frumer and M. I .  Friedman, Products 
Liability (1982), Vol. 3, Chapter 29.03. 
I5O See Grifiths v.  Peter Conway, Ltd., [I9391 1 All E.R. 685 (C.A.). 
I5l Ingham v.  Emes, [I9551 2 All E.R. 740 (C.A.). 
15* Final Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare Expert Advisory 
Committee on Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation (1981), at p. 9. 
153 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Ban of Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, 
Withdrawal of Proposed Information Labelling Rule, and Denial of Petition to Issue a 
Standard, Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 64,14366 at 14386. 
Ibid. 
155 Ibid. ; B. Small, supra, footnote 12 at pp. 69-73. 
Heinonline - -  8  Can. Bus. L.J. 3 5 0  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4  
1983-841 Legal Dimensions of the UFFl Problem 351 
gas, and the significant percentages of the population which 
experience adverse health effects of varying degrees of severity 
depending on the level and duration of exposure, the possible 
argument that the seller ought not to be held responsible for 
alleged idiosyncratic reactions or "abnormal purposes" to which 
the insulation will be put does not seem to be persuasive. 
(4) Trade Practice Legislation 
The final avenue available to homeowners seeking compen- 
sation from installers and chemical manufacturers may be trade 
practice legislation now in force in six provinces, which seeks to 
regulate deceptive marketing practices through a mix of private 
and public law remedies.lS6 The development of trade practice 
legislation in Canada15' has been directed to the regulation of 
consumer misperception and deception regarding product quality 
and performance. This view is reinforced by the shopping list of 
deceptive practices which generally relate to the creation of 
consumer misperceptions respecting product quality rather than 
safety.15* None the less, consumer misperception of safety will 
certainly influence the value of or at least the consumers' 
willingness to pay for the product,ls9 and the statutory definitions 
include references to performance characteristi~s~6~ and 
quality,161 which, in the case of urea formaldehyde foam insula- 
'56 See Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55; Trade Practices Act, S. Nfld. 1978, c. 
10; Business Practices Act, S. P.E.I. 1977, c. 31; Unfair Trade Practices Act, R.S.A. 
1980, c. U-3; Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406 as amended; Consumer 
Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9. 
Is7See M. J. Trebilcock et a]., Proposed Policy Directions for the Reform of the 
Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices in Canada, Vol. I (1976), at pp. 1-12; W. A. W. 
Neilson, "Administrative Remedies: The Canadian Experience with Assurances of 
Voluntary Compliance in Provincial Trade Practices Legislation", 19 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 153 (1981), at pp. 168-74 and 189-98; E. P. Belobaba, "Unfair Trade Practices 
Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection", 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
327 (1 977). 
ls8 Alta. Act, s. 4(l)(d); P.E.I. Act, s. 3(a),Nfld. Act, s. 5(1); Ont. Act, s. 2; B.C. Act, s. 
3(3). The enforcement practices of the provincial governments reflects this emphasis as 
well. See Neilson, supra, footnote 157; see also, E. P. Belobaba, "Some Features of a 
Model Consumer Trade Practices Act", in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual 
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law (1979), at pp. 1-9. 
Is9 The point is incontravertible if one assumes that consumers are indifferent at least to 
some degree, between the risk of personal injury and a reduction in product cost. See 
Guss, supra, footnote 74 at p. 159; J. A. Ordover, "Products Liability in Markets with 
Heterogenous Consumers", 8 J. of Leg. Stud. 505 (1979). 
'"B.C. Act, s. 3(3)(a); Ont. Act, s. 2(a)(i); P.E.I. Act, s. 3(a)(i); Nfld. Act, s. 5(l)(a); 
Alta. Act, s. 4(d)(i). 
16' B.C. Act, s. 3(3)(c); Ont. Act, s. 2(a)(iii); P.E.I. Act, s. 3(a)(iii); Nfld. Act, s. 5(l)(c); 
Alta. Act, s. 4(d)(iii). 
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tion, would include defective performance or inadequate quality 
involving a risk of personal injury or property damage as well as 
reduced insulating characteristics. 
Trade practice legislation, depending of course on the province 
within which the action is brought, offers considerable advan- 
tages over private law contract and tort actions described earlier. 
These advantages relate to the class of potential defendants, the 
imposition of absolute or strict liability against non-direct 
suppliers, the establishment of an objective standard of "wrong- 
fulness", and the availability of economic loss compensation 
against non-direct suppliers. 
Trade practice legislation in all provinces establishes the 
concept of an unfair or deceptive act, the commission of which 
will give rise to civil liability and perhaps the application of 
regulatory sanctions,162 and the British Columbia, Alberta, 
Ontario and Newfoundland Acts refer to non-disclosure or 
failure to disclose as deceptive acts.163 The marketing and instal- 
lation of foam insulation may have taken place under circum- 
stances where the alleged deceptive act took the form of a failure 
to disclose information as to the risks associated with use of the 
product. In addition, the argument can be made that the "mar- 
keting" of a product is  ondu duct"^^ which will be considered 
deceptive, where the qualities and performance characteristics of 
the product do not coincide with reasonable consumer 
expectations. 165 
The implications of establishing non-disclosure or marketing 
conduct as deceptive acts166 (where the deception consists of a 
failure to correct an existing consumer perception regarding the 
safety of a product) are provocative. First, the supplier of 
defective products becomes liable under trade practice legislation 
16* See Belobaba, supra, footnote 157 at pp .  344-8. 
I63 B.C. Act,  S .  3 ( l ) (a) ,  (3)(r);  Alta Act,  s. 4 ( l ) ( i ) ;  Ont. Act, s. 2(a)(xiii); Nfld. Act,  s. 
5(1). 
See B.C. Act, s. 3 ( l ) (b) ;  Alta Act,  s. 4 ( l ) (d ) .  
'65 See G. Q. Taperell, Trade Practices and Consumer Protection, 2nd ed. (1978), p. 494; 
Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation, 3rd ed. (London, Butter- 
worths, 1977), pp. 46-7; Bodger v. Nicholls (1873), 28 L.T. (N.S.) 441; Mullet v. Mason 
(1866), L.R. 1 C.P. 559 at p. 563; C.R.F. Holdings Ltd. v. Fundy Chemical lnterna- 
tional Ltd., (19821 2 W .  W.R. 385,19 C.C.L.T. 263 (B.C.C.A.). 
'66 See Givens v. C.V. Holland (Holdings) Pty. (1977), A.T.P.R. 40-029; Jacob Siege1 v. 
F. T. C., 327 U.S. 608 (1946); Weitman v. Katies (1977), A.T.P. R.  40-041. 
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for loss or damage resulting from the deceptive act. Second, as we 
shall see, liability under the Act is imposed on suppliers who are 
not in a contractual relationship with the injured party. And 
third, liability under the Act is strict (or perhaps absolute). This 
analysis of trade practice legislation may establish a statutory 
strict products liability claim for products which are "defective", 
in so far as their performance or safety characteristics do not 
coincide with consumer expectations.167 
An alternative argument can be made which establishes that 
particular information distributed by direct and non-direct 
suppliers was deceptive in misrepresenting the safety character- 
istics of the product, or by failing to disclose risks.168 While there 
is no logical difficulty with applying trade practice legislation in 
this fashion, the benefits to the public represented by this 
approach are limited. Each consumer who seeks to rely on the 
commission of the deceptive act would have to demonstrate a 
causal relationship between the specific product informational 
material and his loss. At the very least, this will require proof that 
the consumer saw or was otherwise aware of the specific piece of 
promotional material found to be deceptive.169 
In both the "pure" products liability case and the positive 
misrepresentation case, the consumer will be looking to impose 
liability on both contractual (direct) and non-contractual (non-di- 
rect) suppliers. Both Alberta and British Columbia have appar- 
ently abolished the privity doctrine in the context of the 
distribution of goods by commercial enterprises.170 In Ontario, 
however, the potential defendants are limited to those suppliers 
'6' The application of trade practice legislation to products liability cases presumes that 
non-disclosure, or marketing conduct, where the result is to leave consumers under a 
misapprehension about the safety characteristics of a product, is a deceptive act. This is 
the case in most provinces. See supra, footnote 163. See also Kirchner v.  F. T.C. ,  337 
F.2d 751 (1964); J. B. Williams Co. v.  F. T. C . ,  381 F.2d 884 (1967); Director of Trade 
Practices v.  Household Finance Corp. of Canada, [I9771 3 W.W.R. 390,33 C.P.R. (2d) 
284 (B.C.C.A.); Waltham Watch Co. v.  F. T . C . ,  318 F.2d 28 (1963); Simeon 
Management Corp. v .  F. T. C . ,  579 F.2d 1137 (1978). 
168 An example of this might include a sales brochure prepared by one chemical manufac- 
turer which, where it refers to toxicity, simply states that installers need not wear masks 
while applying the product. (Brochure on file at University of British Columbia, 
Faculty of Law.) The liability in this case is based on positive acts of information 
dissemination. 
'69 Query: can "person" in s. 3 of the British Columbia Act be distinguished from "con- 
sumer" as defined in s. 1 of the Act? 
B.C. Act, s. 1, definition of supplier; Alta Act, s. l(h). 
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who "make" a representation, statement, offer, request or 
proposal relating to consumer goods or services.171 While the 
privity restriction would seem to be implicitly avoided, it would 
still seem to be necessary to demonstrate that a particular 
supplier engaged in positive information dissemination activities 
with respect to the product in question. The mere supply of a 
consumer good to an intermediate supplier would appear to be 
insufficient in Ontario. In Newfoundland, the term "supplier" is 
defined to include non-direct suppliers who "offer or advertise" 
the sale of consumer goods to a consumer. Again it would seem 
to be necessary to demonstrate that the supplier engaged in 
information disseminat i~n. '~~ 
One significant difficulty which may be faced by potential users 
of provincial trade practice legislation, even in jurisdictions which 
apparently have abolished the privity requirement, relates to the 
definition of the class of defendants. While vertical privity may 
have been abolished, it is still possible to argue that the manufac- 
turers of the chemicals from which the foam is produced were 
not, simply by manufacturing the components, engaged in the 
supply of a consumer product, and thus do not come within the 
ambit of either the British Columbia or Alberta Acts. In the 
absence of proof of specific manufacturer advertising or promo- 
tional activities the argument can be made that component 
manufacturers were not engaged in the supply of the subject- 
matter of a consumer transaction under the British Columbia 
Act, nor did they manufacture, assemble or produce goods that 
are a subject-matter of a consumer transaction under the Alberta 
Act. It could be argued, however, that the control exercised by 
the component manufacturer over the consumer transaction, 
through ownership of the application patent, and through 
contractual terms detailing the installer's performance of the 
consumer transaction, would permit the court to say that the 
component manufacturer promoted, or otherwise participated or 
engaged in, the supply of a consumer product. 
The nature of the deceptive or unfair act under trade practice 
legislation is that it "deceive or mislead" 173 - the "defect" in the 
l7I Ont. Act, s. 4(3). The same would seem to be true in Prince Edward Island. See P.E.I. 
Act, s .  4(2). 
''2 Nfld. Act, s .  2(g). 
173 See B.C. Act, s .  3(1); Alta Act, s. 4(l)(d). 
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product liability trade practice action is the disappointment of 
consumer expectations rather than the provision of an "unrea- 
sonably dangerous product". The hypothetical normal expec- 
tation of consumers making purchase decisions will, I suspect, be 
judicially defined as contemplating that the product will not cause 
physical injury or property damage, or perhaps that the product 
will not pose an unreasonable risk of physical injury or property 
damage. 174 
Perhaps the singular difference between trade practice act 
products liability and the design defect or failure to warn liability 
discussed earlier involves the standard of deceptiveness 
demanded of the offending activity. In British Columbia, the 
offending conduct, or non-disclosure, must have the capability, 
tendency or effect of misleading a consumer.175 In Ontario, the 
complainant must demonstrate that an individual consumer has 
been misled in fact,176 while Alberta seems to have adopted a 
compromise - the deceptive act must have the effect or might 
reasonably have the effect of deceiving or misleading a 
consumer.177 The adoption of an objective test of deception in 
British Columbia and Alberta, suggests that actions in both 
provinces would require that the violation of the Act be premised 
on a demonstration that some consumers might be misled by the 
representation. In the remaining provinces, the individual 
plaintiff bringing the action would have to demonstrate that he 
was misled in fact. The British Columbia and Alberta objective 
test of deceptiveness affords the courts considerable flexibility in 
determining the critical percentage of consumers who would have 
to have their expectations disappointed before the product would 
be considered defective;178 or perhaps in deciding upon the level 
174 Where the normal expectations of consumers are that the product is "safe" then the 
supply of an "unreasonably dangerous" product without disclosure of the risk may be a 
deceptive act. See Royal Oil Corp. v. F. T. C . ,  262 F.2d 741 (1959); Mohawk Refining 
Corp. v. F. T. C . ,  263 F.2d 818 at p. 821 (1959); Fox Film Corp. v .  F. T .C . ,  296 F .  353 
(1924); Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (1977); James v. Spartelli, 399 A.2d 1047 
(1979); R. v. Pharmo Products Ltd. (No. 3) (1973), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 335 at p. 343, 16 
C.P.R.(2d) 291 at p. 299 (Ont. Co. Ct.). 
175 B.C. Act, S. 3(1). 
176 Ont. Act, s. 4(1). See also, Nfld. Act, s. 5(1); P.E.I. Act, s. 5(1). 
Alta Act, s. 4 ( l ) ( d ) .  
178 See Charles of the Ritz v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d. 676 (1944) (requiring an "appreciable" 
segment of the public to be misled). See H. Beales, R. Craswell and S. Salop, "The 
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information", 24 J.  of L. and Econ. 491 (1981), at p. 
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of sophistication or naivety which should be impressed upon the 
hypothetical consumer into whose hypothetical expectations the 
court is inquiring. In British Columbia, under trade practice legis- 
lation which does not require the court to assess deceptiveness in 
terms of the reasonable consumer, the courts have suggested that 
the conduct need only "tend to lead a consumer into making an 
error of judgment"179 and the hypothetical consumer against 
whom this assessment is made is the unsuspicious, credulous and 
naive consumer.1s0 The test, of course, is objective.lsl 
The explanation of these different formulations of defec- 
tiveness is legislative disagreement upon the optimal amount of 
information which should be acquired and transmitted by product 
suppliers.1s2 Consumers would not be willing to pay for "perfect 
information" even if they could use it in their decisions to 
purchase a consumer product. Recognizing this, the courts have 
adopted the view that the information must be valuable or 
material to a sufficient number of consumers, thereby permitting 
one to draw the conclusion that the consumers would be willing to 
pay the producer of the information the costs of additional 
information production. The only difficulty with this approach in 
the trade practice act model of product liability and information 
497; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.  F. T .C . ,  481 F.2d 246 (1973), at p. 249 cert. denied 
414 U.S. 1112 (1973). 
''9 See Director of Trade Practices v.  Household Finance Corporation, supra, footnote 167 
at p. 391 W.W.R., p. 284 C.P.R.; Weitman v. Katies Ltd., supra, footnote 166. 
Ig0 Stubbe v .  P. F. Collier & Son Ltd. (No. 2)  (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605,30 C.P. R. (2d) 
216 (B.C.S.C.), vard 85 D.L.R. (3d) 77, 41 C.P.R. (2d) 47 (B.C.S.C.). A similar 
standard has been adopted under analogous legislation in Australia, the United States, 
and under the federal Combines Investigation Act. See, Keehn v.  Medical Benefits 
Fund of Australia Ltd. (1977), 14 A.L.R. 77 at p. 81 (ordinary member of the public 
would be led into error); S.R. W .  Pty. Ltd. v. Sneddon (1972), 72 A.R. (N.S.W.) 17 at 
p. 28 (public includes the ingenuous, uneducated and inexperienced; advertiser not 
entitled to assume that consumer will supply omitted facts); World Series Cricket Ltd. 
v.  Parish (1977), 16 A.L.R. 181 at p. 203 (conduct held misleading if it had the 
tendency to mislead the ignorant and gullible); Florence Mfg. Co. v.  J .  C .  Dowd & Co. ,  
178 F .  73 at p. 75 (1910) (law made for the protection of the ignorant, unthinking and 
credulous); R. v.  Imperial Tobacco Products Ltd. (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 51,4 C.C.C. 
(2d) 423 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.). 
'8' See Stubbe v.  P. F. Collier & Son Ltd.   NO.^), supra, footnote 180; R. v.  Belmont 
Motors Ltd. and Ritchie Motors Ltd. (1978), 7 B.C.L.R. 225 (Co. Ct.), at p. 230; 
Sterling v. T.  P. C. (1981), 35 A.L.R. 59; Royal Oil Corp. v. F. T. C . ,  262 F.2d 741 
(1959); Progress Tailoring Co.  v.  F. T.  C . ,  348 U.S. 940 (1955) (surveys admissible as 
evidence of deception); Hornsby Building Information Centre v. Sydney Building 
Information Centre (1978), 18 A. L. R. 639 at p. 651. 
Is2See Beales, Craswell and Salop, supra, footnote 178 at pp. 491-7; Stigler, supra, 
footnote 73. 
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disclosure is that the test of deception would seem to reflect 
accurately only one variable (the degree or likelihood of 
consumer deception, perhaps on a percentage basis) influencing 
the value of the information. Put another way, the value of the 
information in terms of its risk-reduction function is only 
reflected in the rule that the information must have some risk-re- 
duction functions (i.e., that it be "material", or that it "tend to 
lead to an error", or that it affects a consumer decision). The 
degree of materiality (i.e., the value of the information to 
consumers through risk reduction or more accurate pricing) 
would thus seem to be irrelevant in establishing the commission 
of a deceptive act. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
provisions regulating individual recovery introduce this element 
to a degree which might lead to an underproduction of 
information.lg3 The point is that the standard of deceptiveness 
should not only relate to the percentage of consumers whose 
expectations are not met (i.e., who are deceived); it should also 
relate to the magnitude of the potential mistake.lS4 
A critical issue in the definition of a products liability concept 
under trade practice legislation involves the decision as to 
whether liability should be strict or whether responsibility for 
consumer misperception should rest upon proof of fault or negli- 
gence. The cases which have addressed this issue indicate that it is 
not necessary to demonstrate an intention to deceive or 
knowledge of the inaccuracy of consumer per~eption.'8~ The issue 
Is3 Recovery of damages under the Acts requires that the individual consumer has 
suffered loss or damage due to an unfair practice, Alta Act, s. l l ( l )(b);  by reason of the 
deceptive act or practice, B.C. Act, s. 22(l)(a), P.E.I. Act, s. 5(1), Ont. Act, s. 4(1); 
or as a result of the deceptive act, Nfld. Act, s. 14(1). 
Is4See Stigler, supra, footnote 73; E .  R. Jordan and P. H. Rubin, "The Economic 
Analysis of the Law of False Advertising", 8 J .  of Leg. Stud. 527 (1979). 
Iss Findlay v.  Couldwell (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 320, [I9761 5 W.W.R. 340 (B.C.S.C.); 
Director of Trade Practices v.  Household Finance Corp., supra, footnote 179; Srubbe v. 
P. F. Collier & Son Ltd. (No. 2 ) ,  supra, footnote 180 at p. 618 D.L.R. ,  p. 230 C.P.R.; 
Hornsby Building Information Centre v.  Sydney Building Information Centre (1978), 18 
A.L.R. 639; Dairy Vale Metro Co-operative Ltd. v.  Brownes Dairy (1981), 35 A.L.R. 
494; F. T.  C .  v.  Algoma, 291 U.S. 67 (1933); Merck & Co. v. F. T.  C . ,  392 F.2d 921 
(1968); State of Idaho v.  Master Distributors Incorp., 615 P.2d 116 (1980); 
Hyder-lngram Chevrolet Inc. v. Kyle Kutech, 612 S.W.2d 687 (1981); Hornsby 
Building Information Centre v. Sydney Building Information Centre (1978), 18 A.L.R. 
639; Pwru Pty. Ltd. v.  Parkdale Custom Built Furniture (1980), 31 A.L.R. 73. 
It should be noted, however, that the Alberta Act apparently requires, in the case of 
non-disclosure, that the supplier know of the defect, and of the consumer's lack of 
knowledge. Alta. Act, s .  4(l)(c). 
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of negligence, however, has not been dealt with directly. The 
obvious argument can be made that the supplier of consumer 
goods should be responsible only when the misperception of the 
consumers could have been corrected through the provision of 
information at a marginal cost which does not exceed the 
marginal benefit to consumers concomitant with the supply of 
information. As well, one would want to compare the supplier's 
cost of information production and transfer with the cost of 
accident avoidance measures available to the consumers, whether 
through consumer generated information or direct accident 
avoidance behaviour. Alternatively, if one is willing to make the 
assumption that, in most cases, producer information acquisition 
and transfer costs will be lower than user information acquisition 
costs, one might favour a legal rule which would permit the estab- 
lishment of a "due diligence" defence's6 which could be raised by 
the supplier to rebut a presumptive imposition of liability. This 
latter proposition, although it might be appealing,lg7 would seem 
to be contradicted by the statutory language,lg8 the regulatory 
framework,ls9 and judicial decisions suggesting that the 
Is6 See R. v.  City of Sault Ste. Marie (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at p. 181,40 C.C.C. (2d) 
353 at p. 373 (S.C.C.); R. v.  Trophic Canada Ltd. (1981), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 1, [I9811 3 
W.W.R. 158(B.C.C.A.). 
I s7  It ignores the point that the increased litigation transaction costs created by the negli- 
gence standard or due diligence defence will almost certainly result in an externali- 
zation of some "consumer expectation costs", and consequently an over-production of 
"defective" products, a reduction in the incentive effects of damage allocation to the 
product supplier, and a reduction in loss spreading which would take place if catas- 
trophic losses were allocated to producers even where the costs of accident prevention 
exceed the projected accident costs. 
I88 In Ontario, for example, a specific "due diligence" defence is accorded to advertisers 
(Ont. Act, s. 4(9)) and liability in criminal proceedings is premised on knowledge of 
the inaccurate representation (Ont. Act, s. 17(2)); see R. v.  Kester (1981), 121 D.L.R. 
(3d) 143, 58 C.C.C. (2d) 219 (Ont. H.C.J.). See also P.E.I. Act, ss. 5(9), 19(2). 
Similarly, the Newfoundland Act requires knowledge of the inaccuracy in the case of 
corporate officer liability, while the civil offence is premised on occurrence of the 
deceptive act. The British Columbia Act establishes both quasi-criminal sanctions 
under s. 25 and civil remedies under s. 22. Section 26 provides a "due diligence" 
defence for an accused subject to prosecution under s. 25, but, significantly, the Act 
does not provide defences with respect to the "civil" penalties under s. 22. Since the 
Legislature has explicitly provided defences relating to s. 25 of the Act, it is logical to 
assume that liability under s. 22 is absolute. 
The fact that the issue is one of civil rather than criminal liability, and that the civil 
remedy is discretionary, would seem to support a finding of absolute liability. See R. v.  
City of Sault Ste. Marie, supra, footnote 186; R. v.  Trophic Canada Ltd., supra, 
footnote 186; A.-G. Ont. v. Hung (1978), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 550, 21 O.R. (2d) 322 (Co. 
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commission of a deceptive act or practice (i.e., the marketing of a 
product which does not conform to reasonable consumer expecta- 
tions) involves absolute liability in most provinces. lgO 
The logical question, of course, is why after two years, has no 
litigation under trade practice legislation taken place? The 
answer, it seems, is that many of the issues which I have discussed 
have not yet been deliberated upon judicially. As well, an 
assessment of the medical and technical data describing the 
insulation, its performance characteristics and health risks is 
subject to constant reinterpretation and amendment as research 
into the product continues. These legal and technical uncer- 
tainties obviously discourage litigation. At the same time, the 
expense of litigation if borne by one plaintiff, either on his own 
behalf, or as a class representative, is likely to be substantial. 
Conversely, the value of a decision in the potential defendants' 
favour, in terms of reduced damage liability across large numbers 
of claims, suggests that a rational defendant should make a 
capital investment of extraordinary magnitude. While the capital 
investment in litigation is not necessarily predictive of success, 
the complexity and uncertainty of the scientific, technical and 
legal considerations suggest that a plaintiff will be faced with 
potential litigation costs which far exceed the present value of a 
future damage award discounted by the probability of failure. As 
well, and I must admit that my knowledge is impressionistic, the 
multi-party nature of the dispute has given rise to quite pervasive 
free-rider problems. All of this has been exacerbated by the fact 
that the loss is a "consumer loss", uninsured, and in many cases 
has necessitated substantial repair expenses. Finally, the 
prospects of federal government compensation have reduced the 
incentive to litigate to recover the uncompensated remainder, 
and introduced a delay factor into most litigation decisions. 
(5) Economic Loss 
The final issue to be discussed in the context of private rights 
Ct.); compare Mahoney v.  Newfoundland Broadcasting Company Ltd. (1981), 84 
A.P.R. (2d) 68 at p. 78. 
At the same time the imposition of absolute liability for omissions has been criticized 
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v.  Rohan's Rockpile Lrd. and Lowther 
(1981),57C.C.C.(2d)388atp,392,26B.C.L.R.l25atp. 130. 
190 Alberta, it seems, requires that the supplier have knowledge of the defect in the case of 
product defect non-disclosure (Alta. Act. s. 4(c)(iii)), but at the same time would 
appear to impose absolute liability in the case of deceptive positive misrepresentations 
(Alta. Act, ss. 4(l)(d), l l(1)).  
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and urea formaldehyde insulation is the recoverability of 
economic losses by consumers. As suggested earlier, the majority 
of "injured" homeowners have suffered a loss only in so far as the 
market value of their homes has been reduced as a result of public 
perception of the risks associated with formaldehyde foam. A 
prospective buyer of the property will be less willing to pay an 
asking price for the good not only because he may perceive the 
risk of personal injury or property damage associated with the 
good and will therefore demand a reduction in price to reflect that 
risk, but also because he may perceive that future buyers may 
perceive that risk and may be less willing to buy the good. The 
decision will, in fact, be related to both considerations, and it 
would be impossible to extricate one from the other. 
The use of the term "economic loss" in the cases has given rise 
to both confusion and unsophisticated analysis. The term may 
refer to the risk that the product will not be as valuable as that 
which is given (or paid) by the buyer, and to the associated risk 
that the product will not be as valuable as it was represented to 
be. These two risks, generally referred to as "direct" economic 
loss,lgl may also be represented by the cost of replacement and 
repair.192 With limited exceptions,lg3 this type of loss is not 
recoverable by a user of goods against a non-direct supplier.lg4 
I9l See Note, "Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence", 66 Col. L. Rev. 917 
(1966). 
192 Ibid., at p. 918. See also Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at p. 32; P. F. Cane, "Physical 
Loss, Economic Loss and Products Liability", 95 L. Q. Rev. 117 (1979), at p. 130. 
193 The cases which have allowed users to recover direct economic loss from non-direct 
suppliers have not generally analyzed the issues thoroughly, nor has consideration been 
given to doctrine or  economic policy. See Labrecque v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
(1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d) 289, [I9771 6 W. W.R. 122 (Sask. Q.B.), vard 110 D.L.R. (3d) 
686, [I9801 3 W.W.R. 558 (Sask. C.A.) (recovery of lost profits from flax crop 
permitted against manufacturer who failed to warn of risks associated with certain 
manners of use). The case may be explained on the basis of recovery of consequential 
loss. The direct loss was the reduced value of the seed, while the consequential loss was 
the lost profits anticipated from the sale of the crop. See also Fuller v.  Ford Motor Co. 
of Canada Ltd. (1978), 94 D.L. R. (3d) 127 at pp. 133-4,22 O.R. (2d) 764 at pp. 770-1 
(Co. Ct.) (recovery of direct economic loss in case of defective truck); Western 
Processing & Cold Storage Ltd. v .  Hamilton Construction Co. Ltd. (1965), 51 D.L.R. 
(2d) 245,51 W.W.R. 354 (Man. C.A.) (manufacturer of insulating material which did 
not function adequately held liable in tort to compensate non-direct users for costs of 
repairing plant). 
194 See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works (1970), 74 W.W.R. 110 (B.C.S.C.), 
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Economic loss may also refer to consequential losses, which 
include all other losses, including lost revenue resulting from an 
inability to utilize the product in the expected manner.I95 Conse- 
quential economic losses, at least in the case of a failure to warn 
of product risks, as well as economic losses associated with 
personal injury and damage to property other than the product 
supplied, may be recoverable from the non-direct ~upp1ie r . l~~  
It is not often recognized that both direct economic loss and 
consequential economic losses may be associated with a third 
kind of economic loss - abstract economic loss. The concept of 
direct economic loss refers to a reduction in market value or 
repair costs connected to a particular good which is defective 
either in the sense that it does not function adequately, or poses 
an unreasonable risk to health and safety. Abstract economic loss 
refers to a depreciation in market value of all products of a 
particular type. It is not linked to a specific defective product, but 
is a reflection of the market's perception that an entire product 
line poses a risk to health or safety or economic interests. This 
at p. 119, affd 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, [I9741 S.C.R. 1189 (no recovery per se for negligent 
design in the absence of contract); Thomas v.  Whitehouse (1979), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 762, 
24 N.B.R. (2d) 485 (S.C. App. Div.). Where it is possible for the court to find a 
"direct" relationship (for example, in the case of negotiations in which negligent misre- 
presentations are made), the court may allow recovery for direct economic loss, repre- 
sented by the cost of repair even though no privity of contract exists. See Robert 
Simpson Co. Ltd. v. Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 459 at pp. 
476-7,36 O.R. (2d) 97 at pp. 113-14 (C.A.). 
The point, of course, is that this "direct" relation is analogous to "contract" in the 
formal, legal sense of the word, and recovery of economic loss in this "direct" relation 
is awarded for the same reason it would have been awarded had a "contract" relation 
been held to exist. 
195 See Note, supra, footnote 191; Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at p. 35. For the purposes 
of this discussion, consequential economic loss will refer to any financial liability or 
expectation which is incurred or frustrated as a result of the supply of a product, but 
not direct economic loss. The range of possible consequential economic losses is 
infinite. See Waddams, supra, footnote 45. 
The generally accepted view is that consequential loss is not recoverable in tort 
against non-direct suppliers. See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, supra, 
footnote 194; S.C.M. (U.K.) Ltd. v.  W.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [I9711 1 Q.B .  337 
(C.A.), at p. 344; Ital-Canadian Investments Ltd. v. North Shore Plumbing & Heating 
Co. Ltd.,  [I9781 4 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.S.C.). But see Maughan v. International 
Harvester Co. of Canada Ltd. (1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 243,38 N.S.R. (2d) 101 (S.C. 
App. Div.). 
However, if the plaintiffs action is brought as negligent failure to warn, conse- 
quential economic losses may be recoverable. See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v.  Washington 
Iron Works, supra, footnote 194 at p. 542 D.L.R., p. 1207 S.C.R. 
196 See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v.  Washington Iron Works, supra, footnote 194; Labrecque v. 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, supra, footnote 193. 
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stigmatic effect occurs where it is not possible to distinguish 
between particular products which pose a greater risk to health, 
safety or economic interests from those which pose a lesser 
risk.197 The phenomenon, which admittedly will be quite rare, 
requires that information about the risk be disseminated to a 
substantial segment of the market, and requires the existence of a 
product "defect" which does not, with existing technology, 
permit prospective buyers to distinguish dangerous from less 
dangerous products. 
The courts have approached the recovery of economic loss 
through a number of doctrinal techniques. The courts may imply 
a contractual term that the product will be of merchantable 
quality or reasonably fit for its intended use. The implication of 
such terms, or one might say the imposition of such responsi- 
bility, is traditional in all direct relationship (contract) cases, 
except perhaps in the private sale of real estate,198 and permits the 
recovery of economic losses in the absence of personal injury or 
property damage. The still predominant doctrine of privity of 
contract in Canada has precluded the application of the implied 
warranty doctrine to non-direct suppliers,199 but even where this 
has been done in the United States, it is open to debate whether 
recovery of direct economic loss represented by the reduced 
value of the subject transferred, will be permitted.200 Another 
19' I have only been able to discover one case where abstract economic loss was discussed 
by the court, and the issue as to whether this loss should be recoverable was avoided. 
See Two Rivers Company v .  Curtis Breeding Service, 624 F.2d 1242 (1980), at p. 1247. 
198See Scott-Polson v .  Hope (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 333, 25 W.W.R. 427 (B.C.S.C.); 
Alessio v .  Jovica (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 107, [I9731 3 W.W.R. 432 (Alta. S.C. T.D.), 
revd in part 42 D.L.R. (3d) 242, [I9741 2 W.W.R. 126 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.) (no duty 
on a vendor to disclose expenditure necessary to obtain building permit); Redican v .  
Nesbitt, [I9241 S.C.R. 135, [I9241 1 W.W.R. 305. 
199 See Fraser-Bruce Maritimes Ltd. v .  Central Mortgage and Housing Corp. (1980), 117 
D.L.R. (3d) 312,42 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (S.C. App. Div.); Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. 
v .  Beattie (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 228; Sigurdson v .  Hillcrest 
Service Ltd. (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 132, [I9771 1 W.W.R. 740 (Sask. Q.B.). 
200111 Seely v. White Motor C o . ,  403 P.2d 145 (1965), the California Supreme Court 
rejected the proposition suggested in Santor v. A .  and M. Kasaghuesian, Znc., 207 A.2d 
305 (1965), that economic losses for defective quality and performance could be 
recovered in a strict products liability action against a non-direct supplier. 
The Seely decision has been adopted in the vast majority of American jurisdictions: 
see Nobility Homes of  Texas, Inc. v .  Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (1977), at p. 79; Fredonica 
Broadcasting Corp. v. R. C . A .  Corp.,  481 F.2d 781 (1973); Avenell v .  Westinghouse 
Corp.,  324 N.E.2d 583 (1974); Mercer v .  Long Mfg. N. C . ,  Inc., 665 F.2d 61 (1982). 
Where the privity doctrine has been abolished under the Uniform Commercial 
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technique permitting recovery of economic loss has been to 
impose liability for negligent misrepresentation of performance, 
quality, or "value"  characteristic^.^^^ Again, however, the 
liability of a supplier of a "good" which was not as valuable as the 
user expected, is likely premised on a direct relationship with the 
user. 
At the same time, the courts have disallowed recovery of direct 
economic loss in negligence against non-direct suppliers, at least 
in the case of product failure due to negligent design or 
manufacture.202 The non-recovery of economic loss has been 
variously framed in terms of causation,203 duty204 and foreseea- 
bility or remoteness.205 Whatever the doctrinal tool, it is clear that 
the issue of recovery of economic loss in products liability cases is 
a question of The one possible exception to the general 
Code, the majority of jurisdictions still require that a buyer demonstrate a direct 
relationship with the defendant in order to recover economic loss represented by the 
reduced value of the object. See Davis v. Homasote Company, 574 P.2d 1116 (1978); 
State v. CambeN, 442 P.2d 215 (1968); Flory v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc., 633 P.2d 383 
(1981); Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1084 (1979). 
Even where economic loss has been recovered, it has been extended only where the 
particular product purchased is defective in the sense that it does not function 
adequately. See Santor v. A .  and M. Kargheusian, Inc., ibid.; Nobility Homes of 
Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, ibid., at p. 81; Western Equipment Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, 
605 P.2d 806 (1980); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (1976). 
201 See e.g., Herrington v. Kenco Mortgage & Investments Ltd. (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 
377, 29 B.C.L.R. 54 (S.C.) (negligent misrepresentation of value of property secured 
by mortgage influencing decisions of purchaser of mortgage from mortgage broker); 
McBean v. Bank of Nova Scoria (1981), 15 B.L.R. 296 (Ont. C.A.) (negligent advice of 
bank as to economic risks of investment decision); L. Shaddock & Associates Pty. Ltd. 
v. Parramatta City Council (1982), 55 A.L.J.R. 713. 
202 See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, supra, footnote 194; Ital-Canadian 
Investments Ltd. v. North Shore Plumbing & Heating Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 195 at 
pp. 291-2; A.-G. Ont. v. Fatehi (l981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 603 at p. 614, 18 C.C.L.T. 97 
at p. 114 (Ont. C.A.). But see Maughan v. International Harvester Co. of Canada, 
supra, footnote 195. 
203 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Foundation Company of Canada Ltd. (1977), 75 D.L.R. 
(3d) 294, [I9771 2 W.W.R. 717 (B.C.S.C.); or perhaps "directness". See Harvey, 37 
Mod. L. Rev. 320 (1974), at pp. 323-4; Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. The Queen (1977), 78 
D.L.R. (3d) 175 at pp. 194-8, [I9781 1 F.C. 147 at pp. 171-6(T.D.). 
204 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 
522, [I9781 1 F.C. 464 (T.D.); Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contrac- 
tors) Ltd., [I9731 1 Q.B. 27, [I9721 3 All E.R. 557 (C.A.). 
205See Yumerovski v. Dani (1977), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 558, 18 O.R. (2d) 704 (Co. Ct.); 
Spartan Sreel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., supra, footnote 204 at 
pp. 36-7 Q.B., p. 562 All E.R.; Weiner v. Zorani (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 598; 72 
W.W.R. 299 (Man. Q.B.); Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 203 at 
pp. 187-94 D.L.R., pp. 162-71 F.C.; Trappa Holdings Ltd. v. District of Surrey (1978), 
95D.L.R. (3d) 107, [1978]6W.W.R. 546(B.C.S.C.). 
206 See Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., supra, footnote 
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rule that direct economic losses will not be recoverable against 
non-direct suppliers is the cost of repair necessitated by the risk of 
personal injury or property damage which has not yet manifested 
itself.207 This direct economic loss, and of course the costs of 
personal injury and property damage claims which are shifted 
from the injured party to an intermediate supplier,208 may be 
recoverable against a non-direct supplier. In the former case, it is 
possible to argue that the reduction in market value of the 
product may be recoverable.209 
In general, however, legal rules requiring disclosure of 
economic risks by non-direct suppliers, or put another way, legal 
rules permitting the recovery of economic losses by non-direct 
buyers have not been adopted by the courts. The cases suggest 
that recovery of this loss will not be permitted, the doctrinal 
rationale being that the protection of the buyer's expectation of 
the value of the object which he is purchasing is a matter of 
contract law, and not of tort.210 The question, of course, is why 
should this economic loss be considered legally relevant only 
204; A , - G .  Ont. v .  Fatehi, supra, footnote 202 at pp. 622-3 D.L.R., pp. 124-5 
C.C.L.T.; P. S. Atiyah, "Negligence and Economic Loss", 83 L.Q.R. 248 (1967); C. 
Harvey, "Economic Losses and Negligence", 50 Can. Bar Rev. 580 (1972); P. P. Craig 
"Negligent Misstatement, Negligent Acts and Economic Loss", 92 L. Q. Rev. 213 
(1976), at pp. 235-41; R. Hayes, "The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic 
Loss", 12 Mel. U. L. Rev. 79 (1979), at pp. 89-97. 
207 See Batty v. Metropolitan Property Realizations Ltd., [I9781 2 All E.R. 445 (C.A.); 
Thompson v .  Plainsman Developments Ltd. (1981), 19 R.P.R. 226 (B.C. Co. Ct.), at 
pp. 247-8; Rivtow Marine Ltd. v .  Washington Iron Works, supra, footnote 194 at pp. 
548-50 D.L.R., pp. 1216-19 S.C.R. per Laskin J. (dissenting); Ordog v .  District of 
Mission (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 718 at p. 724, 31 B.C.L.R. 371 at p. 378 (S.C.); 
Bowen v. Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd. ,  [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. 394; Anns v. Merton 
London Borough Council, [I9781 A.C. 728 (H.L.), at p. 759per Lord Wilberforce. See 
generally P. F. Cane, supra, footnote 192. But see A.-G.  Ont. v .  Fatehi, supra, 
footnote 202 at pp. 614-16 D.L.R. per Wilson J.A. and pp. 620-1 D.L.R. per Thorson 
J.A., pp. 114-17 C.C.L.T. per Wilson J.A. and pp. 122-3 C.C.L.T. per Thorson J.A. 
208 See Lambert v. Lewis, [I9801 2 W.L.R. 299 (C.A.), affd on other grounds [I9811 1 All 
E.R. 1185 (H.L.),atp. 1192. 
209 See Batty v .  Metropolitan Property Realizations Ltd., supra, footnote 207. 
2"JThis distinction, that performance risks are properly the subject of recovery in 
contract, while risks to person and property are properly the subject of tort, has often 
been stated as a dogmatic conclusion justifying non-recovery. See Nielsen v. City of 
Kamloops (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 111 at p. 121, 31 B.C.L.R. 311 at p. 321 (C.A.) 
(liability for a shoddy product must be founded on basis of contractual relations); 
Cane, supra, footnote 192 at pp. 138-40; see also J. C. Shepherd and R. A. Mueller, 
"The Recovery of Economic Losses on a Product Liability Lawsuit", in Product 
Liability of Manufacturers Prevention and Defence 1979, Practising Law Institute 
(1979), p. 707. 
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between direct suppliers and users of products? The answer may 
be that the allocation of direct economic loss to manufacturers, 
and the imposition of responsibility on manufacturers to disclose 
economic risks whether under the guise of a duty to warn, or by 
permitting recovery of economic loss under a non-privity implied 
warranty doctrine, may cause more problems than it solves. 
In the first place, one must keep in mind that information 
acquisition and transfer is not costless, and that the value of most, 
if not all, information regarding product quality will vary with the 
individual preferences of the prospective recipient. In the case of 
product performance or quality characteristics, the information 
will be available in many cases, albeit in a post-transactional 
context, through use of the product. The transaction costs of 
information acquisition through product use are virtually non-ex- 
istent, and there are clearly no transfer costs. Where the 
magnitude of the economic loss is not likely to be substantial 
(which will be the case where one is concerned only with 
reduction in product value as a result of non-disclosure of perfor- 
mance characteristics which do not accord with the consumers' 
reasonable expectations), the costs of information acquisition and 
transfer by the non-direct supplier when assessed against the 
prospective benefits, and when compared to the consumer's own 
information-gathering abilities through experience with the 
product, may not be justified. Generally, in the case of infor- 
mation regarding product quality involving repetitive transac- 
tions, which can be evaluated on a comparative basis, and in 
respect of which the cost of errors are apt to be relatively low in 
magnitude, the benefits of pre-purchase product performance 
information may not exceed the costs of transfer.211 
21' At the same time, where the product is characterized by rapid technological change, or 
where the purchase is of a "one-time" venture, the experience generated information 
may be useless. See A. Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of 
Coercive Collection", 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970), at p. 40. In that case, pre-purchase 
information may be called for. 
In addition, critical economic information may not be discoverable where the 
consumer has decided to pay for performance characteristics which are, at least to him, 
not worth the price. The injury in this case is not the failure of the good to perform in 
accordance with the consumers expectation, which would normally be detectable 
through use. Rather, the injury is the excess expenditure for a good which performs at 
a level which exceeds the consumer's needs. If the user is unaware of the potential 
performance through pre-transaction performance information, he is unlikely to 
discover through use that he has been injured by paying for what he does not need. See 
R. Pitofsky, "New Programs for Advertising Regulation" in D. Tuerck, Issues in 
Advertising (1978), p. 37. 
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Thus the perplexing analysis of economic loss in the products 
liability cases can perhaps be better understood if we look at 
liability for economic loss as simply the consequence of a failure 
to provide accurate information about the economic value of a 
product, or a failure to warn of economic risks associated with the 
product's use or ownership. This analysis forces us to identify the 
nature of the economic risks, or economic data, which we 
consider appropriate for disclosure. The focus of the inquiry is on 
the misperception of value by the user, and it is difficult to decide 
whether a manufacturer should be obliged to disclose economic 
information relating, for example, to the particular uses to which 
a buyer may be able to put the good, to alternative sources of 
supply of the good, to the buyer's taste for the good, to the 
buyer's ability to use the good for a longer or shorter period of 
time, to the buyer's concern with long-term service facilities, and 
a variety of variables influencing the buyer's valuation and 
willingness to pay for the good, including the direct supplier's 
representations, the price asked, and information generated after 
the manufacturer distributed the good.212 
A related reason for a decision to exempt non-direct suppliers 
from an obligation to disclose economic risks is that the infor- 
mation is not usually quantifiable, thus reducing the extent to 
which consumers will be able to use the information in drawing 
comparisons between products. In addition, in many cases quality 
information or, put another way, information about economic 
risks will not be uni-dimensional, unlike information about safety 
which while not perfectly quantifiable, is uni-dimensional. Most, 
if not all, consumers will view a higher degree of safety as better 
than a low degree. Admittedly, the valuation of safety may differ 
with the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual, but it 
seems likely that the valuation will be in the same direction.213 
212That is not to say that "economic information" is not valuable, and indeed may be 
subject to mandatory disclosure rules. Thus the Federal Trade Commission has 
required disclosure of the employment opportunities of vocational school graduates, 
comparative gasoline octane ratings, light bulb durability and electrical appliance 
energy efficiency. See Pitofsky, supra, footnote 211. 
2'3 HOW, for example, is one to quantify the value represented by the geographical origin 
of the goods which may reflect political preferences, ethnocentrism, or the financial 
stability and reputation of the seller. The latter aspect of the value of goods may itself 
Heinonline - -  8 Can. Bus. L.J. 366 1983-1984 
1983-841 Legal Dimensions of the UFFI Problem 367 
Another obvious difficulty with permitting a user to sue a non- 
direct supplier for direct economic loss is the inability, in many 
cases, for the latter to control the expectations of the user which 
may be created or influenced by the price charged for the good, 
salesmen's representations, direct supplier advertising and the 
terms of the contract to supply the goods. The degree of responsi- 
bility of the manufacturer for user expectations of value is 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify with precision.214 
Moreover, the imposition of liability on non-direct suppliers 
for defective quality in consumer goods may have the same 
impact on consumer choice as has been hypothesized to be the 
case where liability for safety defects is allocated to the non-direct 
supplier. In the latter case it has been argued that consumer 
choice of goods of varying degrees of safety is reduced,215 leaving 
low risk-averse consumers to subsidize high risk-averse 
consumers when all are forced to purchase goods exhibiting a 
standard level of safety. In the case of risks to personal health and 
safety, this standardization of safety, subsidization of high risk 
consumers, and reduction of choice may be acceptable on the 
ground that the apparent differences in desire for safety, or 
perhaps the apparent differences in desire to engage in risk- 
taking activities, are as much related to initial wealth distribution, 
and knowledge of, and ability to process information about risk 
as it is to anything else.216 While we may be willing to forego 
choice and permit subsidization in the case of safety for these 
reasons, the arguments are not so nearly persuasive in the case of 
the economic value of consumer goods relating to their perfor- 
mance. 
An additional point in favour of non-liability for economic 
losses is that while it may force internalization of social costs, and 
reflect the ability and willingness of the seller to remedy defects, and the quality of the 
product purchased and resold by the retailer where "major" retailers may be able to 
influence the quality of goods supplied to them. See Jentz, "Federal Regulation of 
Advertising", Am. Bus. L.J. 409 (1968); D. Swann, Competition and Consumer 
Protection (1979), p. 174. 
214 See Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at p. 33, Cane, supra, footnote 192 at pp. 138-9. 
215 See W. Oi, "The Economics of Product Safety", 4 Bell J .  of Econ. 3 (1973); J. A .  
Ordover, "Products Liability in Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers", 8 J .  of Leg. 
Stud. 505 (1979), at pp. 506-7. 
216This may explain intuitive statements holding that physical interests are somehow 
"intrinsically more worthy of protection" than economic ones. See Cane, supra, 
footnote 192 at pp. 129,134,138. 
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provide incentives to provide "better" products, it simultane- 
ously reduces the incentives of both consumers and other partici- 
pants in the distributive process to take measures to reduce the 
risk of accidents, or the consequences of accidents which do 
In the case of risks of personal injury and property 
damage, this consequence may not be significant if one assumes 
first, that direct suppliers can do little to reduce the potential 
injuries and property damage resulting from the use of defective 
products, and second, that most consumers will not be indifferent 
between their personal safety and monetary compensation in 
damages.218 In the case of economic risks relating to product 
value, the obvious response is that the seller can reduce the risk 
by negotiating its allocation, by modification of the price, or 
through modification of the product description. In all of these 
cases, the risk is voluntarily assumed by the consumer buyer, at a 
price, and thus the "accident" which might otherwise occur does 
not.219 This reduction in economic injury not only can be achieved 
by the direct supplier and consumer through product choice and 
contract negotiation; it seems that we might very well think it 
desirable. 
It is through this mechanism that we permit consumer choice 
among goods of infinite degrees and kinds of value associated 
with infinite economic variables, depending upon taste, degree of 
risk aversion, and willingness to pay. The point is that allocation 
of responsibility for economic risks to the manufacturer, by 
reducing direct supplier incentives to reduce economic accidents, 
may reduce choice, perhaps oblige low-risk consumers to 
subsidize high-risk consumers, and give rise to more frequent 
accidents. 
The argument can also be made that direct economic loss can 
never exceed the market value of the pr~per ty .~~O The magnitude 
of this loss will, in most product liability cases, normally be 
assessed at a fraction of the capital value of the good. Likewise, 
217 See Oi, supra, footnote 215; Epstein, supra, footnote 40 at pp. 41,42. 
2'8 See Epstein, supra, footnote 40 at pp. 42,43; Guss, supra, footnote 74 at p. 168. 
219 See Guss, supra, footnote 74 at p. 159. 
220 Unless cost of repairs are permitted where the appreciation in market value concom- 
itant to the repairs is exceeded by the repair expenses. This may occur, but at best it 
will be an infrequent occurrence, and when it does occur the court may very well limit 
recovery to the depreciation in market value. See D. Harris, A.  Ogus and J .  Phillips, 
"Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus", 95 L. Q. Rev. 581 (1979), at pp. 
589-94. 
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the transaction costs necessary to shift this loss to the manufac- 
turer, both in terms of the number of plaintiffs and difficulties of 
proof of loss, may not justify establishing legal rules which would 
permit the loss redistribution to take place.221 
The limitation on recovery of direct economic loss from 
manufacturers may reflect the difficulty in determining the degree 
of responsibility which the non-direct supplier bears for the 
market depreciation associated with both direct and abstract loss. 
The reduction in the willingness of prospective buyers to pay a 
certain price for the good may relate to an infinite range of 
factors, including the cost of credit, increased supply of this good 
or substitute goods, and changes in taste. In the case of direct 
economic loss, the risks of error in attempting to differentiate the 
defect devaluation from the extrinsic variables affecting market 
value are reduced to a degree by comparing the price obtainable 
for the defective good with that for non-defective goods. Where, 
however, the entire product line is devalued, as in the case of 
abstract economic loss, the risks of error in determining the 
relationship between the presence of the defect and the market 
devaluation may be quite significant. The product line must be 
evaluated against alternate goods, and there is a significant possi- 
bility that the difference in value may be related to some attribute 
or attributes other than the risk of the safety defect. 
A further explanation for a decision to deny recovery of direct 
economic loss may reflect the fact that the value of a product, 
especially a consumer product, is not measured simply by the 
price at which the consumer could sell the good. To some degree 
at least, a consumer with a valueless consumer good may be 
better off than he would have been without the good to the extent 
that the product is functioning adequately. The risk of over-com- 
pensation is exacerbated in the case of abstract economic loss 
where we assume that the product is functioning perfectly. 
Accordingly, the court, if it were to award the direct or abstract 
economic loss in its entirety, would have to ignore the use 
aspect222 of the consumer's contractual expectation and benefit. 
Alternatively, an award of direct or abstract economic loss would 
involve the investment of additional judicial resources to 
22' See D .  N.  Dewers, J .  R. S.  Prichard and M. J .  Trebilcock, "Class Actions as a 
Regulatory Instrument", Ontario Economic Council, Discussion Paper (1980). 
222 See Bonbright, Valuation of Property, Vol. I (1937), p. 315. 
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determine the value to be allocated to this use aspect, which 
would vary with each consumer, and which then could be 
deducted from the economic damage award. This risk of over- 
compensation, and in some cases under-compensation, especially 
in the case of abstract economic loss, as well as the costs of assess- 
ment, may influence the court to deny recovery entirely. 
An additional reason why recovery of abstract economic loss, 
and perhaps direct economic loss, is avoided by the courts in the 
case of non-direct suppliers is the concern that the market devalu- 
ation, which is not only directed at a particular good ( i .e . ,  a direct 
economic loss) but is directed at a non-direct supplier's product 
line, will often vary with the publicity and drama surrounding the 
triggering event.223 The consumer's perception of "hazardous- 
ness" will reflect not simply the probability of the risk material- 
izing, but will reflect the immediacy and notoriety of the product 
ban or perhaps judicial declarations of design negligence. This 
distortion of risk may be exacerbated by the apparent real estate 
industry practice of requiring specific disclosure of the presence 
or prior existence of foam insulation in the home. In such cases, it 
is quite possible that this specific disclosure may increase the 
market's emphasis on the formaldehyde risk at the expense of 
more salient information.224 The market value depreciation may 
simply reflect a transient, self-remedying aberration in consumer 
taste. The reluctance to award this loss, especially where it is 
unrelated to a specific product defect which has manifested itself, 
recognizes that perception of risk will vary with time, and may 
very well degrade as the drama of the event fades.225 
223 B. Fischoff, "Cognitive Liabilities and Product Liability", (1977) 1 J. of Prod. Liab. 
207 at pp. 208-9. The over-perception of risk may be due to the "bias of availability" 
which may distort perceived probabilities on the basis of the ease with which one can 
imagine similar past events. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", 185 Science 1124 (1974). This phenomenon may 
explain the dramatic difference, at least at one point in time, between market losses in 
several American states and Canada. See Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
supra, footnote 6 at 14400. 
224 See Beales, Craswell and Salop, supra, footnote 178 at pp. 524-5. 
2'5 In fact, it may be argued that the perception of risk may degrade to  a degree where 
consumer behavior reflects a consistent underestimation of risk, due to an apparent 
psychological bias towards the de-emphasis of negative events through selective reten- 
tion. See P. Nemetz, er al . ,  Regulation of Toxic Chemicals in the Environment, 
Working Paper No. 20, Regulation Reference, Economic Council of Canada (1981), at 
p. 50; P. Vertinsky, "The Use of Mass Communication Strategies to  Promote Life- 
Style Change: The Case of Energy Conservation in Canada", in P. Nemetz, ed., 
Energy Policy, The Global Challenge (1981), pp. 383-420. 
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Possibly the strongest argument against recovery of abstract 
direct economic loss involves an analysis of the loss-spreading 
consequences of recovery. In the normal course of events, a 
function of tort law will be to distribute catastrophic economic 
losses from one injured user to large numbers of the public 
whether through producer third party insurance, self-insurance, 
or allocation of the loss to shareholders and employees.226 In the 
case of abstract direct economic loss, the injury will only rarely be 
catastrophic, and because products liability insurance will only 
rarely, if ever, be available to spread the loss,227 the non-direct 
supplier will in many cases simply redistribute the loss to another 
set of product users. Thus it is entirely possible that permitting 
recovery of abstract economic loss will simply involve loss shifting 
from one widely spread class of users to another. It may be 
difficult to justify the transaction costs necessarily incurred in 
such a case if this "boomerang" loss redistribution activity is the 
expected result. 
The foam insulation cases, and perhaps they are unique, 
involve economic losses which are clearly abstract, but at the 
same time are clearly consequential in nature. This abstract 
consequential economic loss, arises from a product (insulation) 
which is inextricably combined with another product (the 
residential home) in such a way that the relatively insignificant 
abstract direct economic loss (represented by the reduction in 
market value of insulation) has been transformed into a 
substantial abstract consequential economic loss (represented by 
the reduction in market value of the home).228 In addition, the 
2261n commercial transactions the argument can be made that the economic risks 
associated with product quality may be spread at a lower cost by the product user 
rather than through third party insurance by the product supplier. See P. S. Atiyah, 
Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed. (London, Werdenfeld & Nicolson, 
1980) p. 90. Whatever the truth of this thesis in the case of defective quality, it seems 
that provision of third party insurance in the case of abstract economic loss in the case 
of design defects is not the ordinary case. See Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at pp. 
217-19. 
227 Waddams, supra, footnote 45 at pp. 38-9. 
22SThe classification of the loss as abstract consequential economic loss explains, I think, 
the paucity of cases in which this issue has been discussed. See supra, footnote 197. In 
the normal course of events, the abstract direct economic loss will be insubstantial, 
limited to  the expected capital value of the good, and in many cases the loss will be a 
small fraction of the capital value. The relative insignificance of the loss, especially 
where the good is functioning adequately, coupled with the "expectation" nature of the 
injury will not usually create the necessary incentive to litigate. 
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devaluation of the home is perhaps related to perceived risks to 
safety and property. I say "perhaps", because in many cases the 
willingness of prospective buyers to pay may be influenced, to a 
greater or lesser degree, not by a subjective perception of risk to 
safety, but also by a concern with the capital value of his 
investment due to others7 perception and valuation of safety risks 
(and of others' perceptions of economic risks). The point is that, 
in the foam insulation case, the economic risks and risks to 
personal safety have become impossible to extricate from one 
another.229 If we premise liability for direct economic losses on 
the apparent qualitative difference between risks to personal 
safety or health and risks to product value, and allow recovery of 
economic losses in the former case only,230 it becomes exceed- 
ingly difficult to decide into which category we place a product 
which reflects substantial elements of both. 
Finally, it is not clear whether the abstract economic loss is due 
to our technological inability to distinguish safe from dangerous 
houses, or to a widespread public reluctance to rely on existing 
technology which is able to discriminate between the defective 
and non-defective products. At the same time, it is quite possible 
that all homes are defective in that all pose a risk to health or 
safety, and that the distinction to be drawn among homes is 
simply the degree, nature and perhaps timing of the risk. 
If that is so, then to insist that this market loss should not be 
recoverable, on the grounds that no real danger exists, in effect, 
ignores the valuation of the risk by the market. The aggregate 
economic loss, reflected in devaluation of property values, repre- 
sents the price which the public is demanding in return for 
229 A similar phenomenon is apparent in the case of "ineffective" drugs. The drug does 
not pose a risk to  health or safety in the sense that it "causes" injury, and thus can be 
viewed as an economic risk. At the same time, the user may, in choosing an ineffective 
drug, fail to use an effective good and thus expose himself to a risk to personal safety or 
health. The ineffective drug case is analogous to the UFFI case. The risk, which is 
reflected in devaluation, is related to both safety and economic variables. 
230 Even where recovery of direct economic loss has been held to be recoverable against a 
non-direct supplier, the recovery has been premised on a demonstration that this 
particular product does not function in accordance with the user's expectations, or has 
caused physical injury or property damage. See supra, footnote 200; W. Kimble and 
R. 0. Lesher, Products Liability (1979), pp. 147-50; Crocker v .  Winthrop 
Laborarories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (1974); Fuller v.  Ford Motor Co. of Canada Lid. (1978), 
94 D.L.R. (3d) 127, 22 O.R.  (2d) 764 (Co. Ct.); Bowen v. Paramount Builders 
(Hamilton) Lid. ,  [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. 394; Mount Albert Borough Council v. Johnson, 
[I9791 2N.Z.L.R. 234. 
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exposure to the hazard. One can state, as I have done, that the 
court should reassess market behaviour, and one can argue that 
this perceived loss in welfare results from the distorted and 
inflated value which members of the public place on their lives. 
None the less, the loss reflected in the market devaluation of the 
homes, in light of perceived risks to personal health and safety, is 
real, and to ignore it is to insulate the product supplier from this 
element of social cost. 
(To be continued) 
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